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Abstract
For more than a decade, research has demonstrated decision makers’ 
unwillingness to rely on decision aids. However, extant research has most often studied 
the use of unfamiliar decision aids. For example, Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and 
Messier, Kachelmeier, and Jensen (2001) provide evidence of auditors working 
backwards in the use of an unfamiliar decision aid. The current study builds on extant 
research by using process tracing software in an experimental setting to test whether 
auditors have learned from a decision aid used in practice and how learning affects 
decision aid use in relation to the use of an unfamiliar decision aid. Auditors used either 
a familiar decision aid, a modified familiar decision aid, an unfamiliar decision aid or a 
modified unfamiliar decision aid to compute a nonstatistical sample size. Results 
indicate that decision aid familiarity does not affect the auditors decision to work 
backwards, approximately 30 percent of auditors in all conditions worked backwards to 
alter the decision aid sample size. Further, working backwards has the affect of 
eliminating the significant, negative relationship that should exist between the number of 
controls tested and the substantive sample size. It also appears that auditors acquire task 
specific knowledge from general audit experience rather than task specific experience 
with the decision aid.
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1.0 Introduction
Auditors use substantive sampling to obtain evidence to support their audit 
opinion. Auditing standards [see for example SAS 39 (AICPA 1981) and SAS 47 
(AICPA 1983)] give auditors guidance on designing audit samples and evaluating 
the results obtained from those samples. Additionally, the AICPA and some 
individual audit firms provide auditors with decision aids for computing 
nonstatistical sample sizes. Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Messier, 
Kachelmeier, and Jensen (2001) investigate the effect the AICPA decision aid has 
on the calculation of nonstatistical sample sizes. They provide experimental 
evidence that auditors work backwards, circumventing, what is to the auditors, an 
unfamiliar decision aid. A working backwards strategy, in this case, is 
characterized by changing the required decision aid input factors until the output 
(i.e., sample size) is consistent with the auditor’s intuitive assessment of sample 
size.' If working backwards is pervasive among auditors, they may not be 
achieving the desirable effects that a decision aid may provide.^
For example, if auditors use their firm’s decision aid inappropriately, they 
may be relying on a sample size that differs from the firm’s definition of a
' Ellis and Hunt (1993,270; see also, Matlin 1983; Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1958; and 
Wickelgren 1974) define working backwards as “seeing what the solution ought to look like and 
then working backwards from the solution to the current problem state.” In a broader sense it 
consists of breaking the problem into subgoals, which fricilitates problem solving. However, the 
path from the current state to the goal state in the AICPA decision aid is shorter (e.g., two steps) 
than most psychology applications; therefore, the operationalization of working backwards for this 
research is altering the decision aid inputs.
* Desirable effects that decision aids may provide include: (1) increased consistency in the 
combination of decision aid inputs (Einhom 1972), and (2) increasing consensus across 
individuals as the decision aid focuses each user’s attention on “normatively relevant information 
resulting from training in the use o f the aid” (Libby and Libby 1989,737).
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rational sample size given the client’s characteristics.^ People, in general, are not 
good intuitive statisticians (Meehl 1957). Tversky and Kahneman (1971) point 
out that individuals often place too much reliance on small samples. If auditors 
circumvent the decision aid to rely on an intuitive sample size that is smaller than 
the decision aid sample size, then the audit firms are potentially bearing additional 
audit risk.'* This increased audit risk exposes the audit firm to a heightened 
probability of litigation if an auditee’s stakeholders discover a previously 
undisclosed error. Alternatively, an inefficient audit would occur if an auditor 
chooses to circumvent the decision aid and rely on an intuitive sample size that is 
larger than the decision aid sample size. Firms are facing competitive pressure to 
eliminate audit inefficiencies. Therefore, if auditors use a decision aid 
inappropriately, an ineffective or inefficient audit may result.
The working backwards behavior observed by Kachelmeier and Messier 
(1990) and Messier et al. (2001) may be due to their participants’ unfamiliarity 
with the AICPA’s decision aid. In practice, auditors use a decision aid on 
multiple occasions, rather than only a single instance, which may mitigate the 
working backwards behavior observed in these studies. By using the decision aid 
on multiple occasions, auditors gain experience with the decision aid, thereby 
acquiring knowledge for calculating nonstatistical sample sizes with the decision 
aid. This accumulated knowledge, referred to as a knowledge structure, could
 ^The finn has expended time and effort to develop a nonstatistical sample size decision aid that 
aids auditors in calculating what the firms believes to be a rational sample size given the client’s 
characteristics. The decision aid also provides a potential defense in the event of litigation.
* Audit firms may have other ways, such as increased reliance on analytical procedures, to 
minimize audit risk.
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contain information on the required decision aid parameters, the form of the input 
parameters, how the decision aid manipulates the inputs and what combination of 
inputs will lead to the desired sample size output.
This study uses process tracing software to experimentally investigate 
auditors’ working backwards behavior. Audit seniors and managers analyzed the 
case used by Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Messier et al. (2001), which 
facilitates direct and analogous comparisons between their studies and the results 
of this investigation.^ After analyzing the case, participants determined a 
nonstatistical sample size using a decision aid. Because decision aid familiarity 
may eliminate working backwards behavior, aid familiarity is manipulated in a 
between-participants design. The auditors received either their firm’s 
nonstatistical sample size decision aid or the AICPA nonstatistical sample size 
decision aid contained in the 1999 Audit Sampling practice release used by 
Messier et al. (2001). In an effort to further our understanding of what an auditor 
may learn through the use of a decision aid, auditors are tested on their knowledge 
of a familiar decision aid component.
This study makes three contributions to the current body of knowledge on 
decision aids. Foremost, this is the first study to provide direct evidence, through 
the use of process tracing software, on the use of a working backwards strategy.^ 
Second, this study tests whether aid familiarity influences an auditor’s observable
 ^Appendix A contains the case and the two post-experimental questionnaires.
‘ This is in contrast to ‘indirect’ evidence provided by Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and 
Messier et al. (2001). They compared the intuitive sample size of one group of auditors to the 
mechanically computed sample size of a group of auditors that provided only the decision aid 
inputs (i.e., the dollar amount of tolerable misstatement, the degree of reliance on other audit 
procedures to test the same objective, and the assessment of inherent and control risk) without 
knowledge o f the decision aid model for combining the decision aid inputs.
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processing strategy. Third, this study tests decision aid knowledge acquisition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
provides background. Section Three presents the theory and develops hypotheses. 
The experimental methodology is included in Section Four. Section Five presents 
the results, while Section Six provides a discussion of the conclusions and 
implications of this work. The final section discusses potential future research.
2.0 Background
The goal of the audit is to express an opinion on whether the client’s 
financial statements reflect its financial position and the results of operations in 
accordance with GAAP. The third standard of fieldwork requires the auditor to 
examine sufficient evidence to provide a basis for the audit opinion (AICPA 
1972). Evidence may be obtained by examining the entire population or by 
sampling. If the auditor decides that sampling is to be used, the auditor is then 
faced with the decision of how to determine the appropriate sample size. The 
auditor may choose to apply statistical or nonstatistical sampling. In statistical 
sampling the auditor decides the maximum level of acceptable sampling risk, 
which is the probability that the auditor will reach an incorrect conclusion because 
the population was sampled rather than examined in its entirety. The chosen level 
of sampling risk is mathematically incorporated into the determination of sample 
size. Alternatively, nonstatistical sampling relies on an auditor’s intuitive 
assessment, rather than a normative model, to determine the sample size 
necessary to reach a conclusion about whether the population under examination 
satisfies the audit objectives. The auditor may apply nonstatistical (i.e., 
judgmental) sampling if  it is decided that the costs of statistical sampling 
outweigh the benefits. Because nonstatistical sampling does not require auditors 
to explicitly quantify inputs, such as sampling risk, it is less time consuming and, 
hence, less costly than statistical sampling (AICPA 1999,11).
The use o f nonstatistical sampling presents possible problems in the audit 
environment. Because sampling risk is not explicitly incorporated into the sample
size decision, auditors may be introducing an miacceptable level of audit risk into 
the audit process. Audit risk is the probability that the auditor will conclude that 
the financial statements are fairly stated when, in fact, they are not. An 
unacceptable audit risk level would occur if the auditor selected a sample size that 
was too small to obtain the desired degree of assurance. Assurance is a 
probability expressing how confident an auditor wants to be in the conclusion 
reached about the financial statements.^ Conversely, if the sample size is too 
large, the auditor may be decreasing audit risk at the cost of an inefficient audit. 
Either way, the use of nonstatistical sampling poses potential problems.
The process of review may mitigate some of the potential for auditors to 
choose inappropriate nonstatistical sample sizes. For example, if a senior chooses 
a nonstatistical sample size that is too small (large), when the audit manager 
reviews the senior’s sample size determination it may be suggested that the 
sample size be increased (decreased). In addition, peer review may enhance 
learning from decision aids. For example, Libby (1995) finds that supervisory 
review is effective because it promotes the learning of causal relations.
In addition to the review process another way that public accounting firms 
can constrain an individual’s choices is through the development and use of 
decision aids.^ Decision aids can improve the decision making process by 
minimizing the effects of judgmental biases (e.g., Dawes, Faust, and Meehl
 ^Assurance is the complement to audit risk.
'  I use Rohrmaim’s (1986,365) definition of a decision aid. Rohrmaim defines a decision aid as 
“any explicit procedure for the generation, evaluation and selection o f alternatives that is designed 
for practical application and multiple use.”
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1988).^ An accountant’s experiences, learning, and perceptions may contribute to 
judgmental biases (Gibbins 1984). Judgmental biases may result because the 
auditor, at any given time, is both subjectively perceiving the current environment 
and trying to assimilate those perceptions within the framework of an existing 
schema (i.e., knowledge structure) (Gibbins 1984). It is the subjective 
perceptions that often lead individuals to apply decision rules inconsistently 
(Gibbins 1984).
Decision aids can improve decision making by increasing consistency in 
the application of decision rules. Einhom (1972) and Bonner, Libby, and Nelson 
(1996) demonstrated the benefit of permitting individuals to select the information 
cues and then using a mechanical model to combine the cues into a judgment. By 
using a mechanical model to combine cues consistency is increased.
While the benefits that decision aids provide have been demonstrated in a 
variety o f situations, an equally large body of research has documented decision 
makers’ unwillingness to rely on decision aids. Many factors may influence a 
decision maker’s willingness to rely on a decision aid. Several factors have been 
empirically examined, for example, justification (Ashton 1990 and 1992), 
financial incentives (Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen 1986; Ashton 1990), 
performance feedback (Ashton 1990; Davis and Kotteman 1995), and decision 
maker task expertise (Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen 1986). In general.
’ One way that decision aids may improve the decision process is by decomposing a global 
judgment into composite judgments. The sub-tasks focus the auditor’s attention on normatively 
relevant information.
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individuals have resisted the use of mechanical models because of a “perceived 
attack on decision makers’ prized judgmental ability” (Libby 1981, 105).'®
Most extant decision aid reliance research has studied the use of decision 
aids that were made available to participants to use if they so chose. However, 
within some audit firms (e.g.. Grant Thornton 1996) the use of firm specific 
decision aids is required as they represent an integral part of the audit work 
papers. Although an auditor is reluctant to rely on the decision aid, it cannot 
simply be disregarded in favor of an intuitive sample size assessment. For 
example. Grant Thornton requires auditors who deviate from the decision aid 
sample size by 10 or more to write a memo justifying the deviation. ' ' However, 
an auditor may choose to manipulate the decision aid inputs to achieve the desired 
sample size output.'^ The manipulation of decision aid inputs is indicative of an 
auditor’s reluctance to rely on a required decision aid.
2.1 AICPA Nonstatistical Sampling Decision Aid
The AICPA has recently revised the nonstatistical decision aid contained 
in the 1983 Audit Sampling gu ide .The  AICPA 1999 nonstatistical sample size 
decision aid and its 1983 predecessor use Probability Proportional to recorded 
Size (PPS) sampling as their basis (AICPA 1999,52; AICPA 1983,74-76).'^
Over-reliance on decision aids has also been shown; however, over-reliance most often occurs 
with novice decision makers (for example, Glover, Prawitt, and Spilker 1997)
"  This is not expected to bias the results because there is no reason for the firm’s auditors to 
believe that this latitude would be unavailable with the AICPA decision aid.
"  Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson (1995) find a similar effect in a tax setting.
A copy o f the revised decision aid is contained in Appendix B.
Appendix C discusses Probability-Proportional-to-Size sampling in detail.
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PPS sampling incorporates sampling risk into the determination of sample size by 
increasing the likelihood that larger items are sampled. If there are misstatements 
in larger items, they are more likely to result in a material misstatement of the 
financial statements.
The revised decision aid requires auditors to determine two decision aid 
inputs: tolerable misstatement and an assurance factor. The calculation of 
tolerable misstatement is primarily a mechanical task to determine the amount of 
account misstatement that can occur without indicating material misstatement in 
the financial statements. The 1999 revision incorporates a tolerable misstatement 
worksheet. In calculating tolerable misstatement the auditor first determines 
whether total assets or total revenues are greater, locates the appropriate 
percentage from the table in the tolerable misstatement worksheet, and then 
performs the specified mathematical computation.
The 1999 revision significantly affects the determination of the assurance 
factor. The assurance factor attempts to associate two audit parameters with the 
desired degree of sample assurance. The assurance factor is based on the 
auditor’s subjective assessment of inherent and control risk and the auditor’s 
reliance on other audit procedures to test the same audit objectives. Another 
revision in the 1999 Auditing Practice Release was the modification of the 
assurance factor values. The values previously ranged from 1.5 to 6 and in the 
revised Auditing Practice Release range from 1 to 3. This change in parameter 
values, in and of itself, results in smaller sample sizes when using the current 
decision aid. The change in parameter values may be the AICPA’s attempt to
recognize a decreased reliance on substantive test sampling in favor of increased 
reliance on analytical procedures and tests of controls during audit engagements.
2.1.1 Tests of the AICPA Decision Aid
Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) used a draft of the 1983 Audit Sampling 
guide and Messier et al. (2001) used a draft of the 1999 Audit Sampling Auditing 
Practice Release to examine the effect that the AICPA nonstatistical sampling 
decision aid has on the determination of sample size. They had audit seniors and 
managers analyze a case and determine a nonstatistical sample size. The auditors 
were assigned to one of several conditions. Auditors determined the sample size 
without mention of a model (i.e., an intuitive sample size), determined the sample 
size given the AICPA decision aid, or provided the parameters for the AICPA 
model without knowledge of how the parameters would be combined. Other 
variables manipulated are not relevant to this investigation (i.e., population size 
and exclusion of the AICPA tolerable misstatement worksheet).
A key finding of Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Messier et al. 
(2001) is that auditors appear to work backwards when using the AICPA decision 
aid. The evidence of working backwards comes ftom comparing the sample size 
given by auditors who used the AICPA decision aid to the mechanically 
computed sample size of auditors who provided only the AICPA decision aid 
model parameters (i.e., tolerable misstatement and the assurance factor). The 
mechanically computed sample size of the “parameters-only” condition was 
significantly larger than the sample size given by auditors in the decision aid
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condition. The authors interpreted this finding to mean that the auditors in the 
decision aid condition had worked backwards (i.e., manipulated the decision aid 
input parameters to achieve the desired sample size output).
The use of a specified model ensures that the same parameters are 
consistently combined; however, individual differences may exist in the selection 
of the decision aid parameter values from the tables contained in the AICPA 
decision aid (e.g., the AICPA decision aid assurance factor table has 16 possible 
values). Table I reproduces the AICPA assurance factor table. The selection of 
decision aid parameter values is based on the subjective evaluation of the audit 
client. Because the evaluation is subjective, different auditors may choose 
different descriptors to describe the same audit client. For example, in assessing 
the same audit client, one auditor may feel the reliance on other audit procedures 
is moderate, while another auditor feels the reliance is substantial. Differences in 
the selection of factors from the tables may contribute to working backwards. If 
the auditor believed the decision aid was contributing to under- or over-auditing, 
the decision aid inputs may be altered to change the resulting sample size output. 
Working backwards can be accomplished by altering the subjectively determined 
assurance factor. For example, ceterus paribus, changing the reliance on other 
audit procedures from substantial to moderate when the assessment of control risk 
is slightly below maximum will change the sample size from 36 to 47.
II
Table 1
Assurance Factors for Nonstatistical Sampling Formula
ASSESSMENT 
OF CONTROL 
RISK (AND 
INHERENT 
RISK)
RELIANCE ON OTHER RELEVANT AUDITING 
PROCEDURES
None Little Moderate Substantial
Maximum 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.0
Slightly below 
maximum
2.7 2.4 2.0 1.6
Moderate 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.2
Low 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.0
Because the only extant results are indirect, the next step is to directly 
observe, through the use of process tracing, whether auditors work backwards.'^ 
Therefore, one of the goals of this paper is to provide direct evidence on the 
existence, or lack thereof, of the working backwards behavior suggested by 
Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Messier et al. (2001).
2.2 The Firm's Nonstatistical Sample Size Decision Aid
A national audit firm’s nonstatistical sample size decision aid was used as 
the familiar decision aid for this research.'^ This decision aid was chosen because 
it is characteristically similar to the revised AICPA decision aid. Both decision
It is also possible that auditors mentally calculate and manipulate sample size, which would be 
unobservable.
The aid is familiar to the research participants.
12
aids require the auditor to select decision aid input factors from multiple tables 
and combine the inputs according to a pre-specifred m o d e l . A s  evidenced in 
Table 2, the frrm decision aid is as complex, or arguably more complex, than the 
AICPA decision aid. The number of mathematical manipulations contributes to 
the firm decision aid’s complexity. The firm decision aid’s complexity may 
inhibit learning. However, the firm decision aid has more steps because the firm 
decision aid decomposes the task further than the AICPA decision aid. Task 
decomposition may facilitate learning. Any differential task complexity, in this 
research, is minimized through the use of computer-performed calculations and 
researcher choice in selecting the firm decision aid parameter factor for 
environmental assessment (Table 2, Step 2d). In addition, if the AICPA decision 
aid is easier to use, this would bias toward the null hypothesis, as explained later.
To use the firm decision aid the auditor first uses a worksheet to determine 
tolerable misstatement. The firm decision aid examines all items that are 
individually material and samples the remainder of the population.'* To 
determine the appropriate sample size the auditor selects parameters from three 
tables: a sample size adjustment factor, an environmental assessment factor, and 
an expected aggregate error factor. The sample size adjustment factor adjusts the 
base sample size for reliance on related substantive audit procedures and the 
assessed level of control risk. The environmental assessment factor adjusts the
The minimum sample size o f the firm and AICPA decision aid is 10 and 22, respectively. The 
maximum sample size o f the firm and AICPA decision aid is 138 and 83, respectively. The 
minimum and maximum sample sizes are based on total assets of $50,783,000. Potential floor and 
ceiling effects are eliminated by non-extreme case characteristics. The mean sample size in 
Messier et al. (2001) is 30.
"  To avoid confounding effects the auditors in the firm decision aid condition will be told that no 
individual items are material.
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base sample size for the effect of environmental factors, significant audit evidence 
from other audit procedures when auditing nominal accounts, or if the audit 
objective is population completeness. The expected aggregate error factor adjusts 
the sample size for errors that are expected in the sampled population. The final 
step is to perform the calculations to arrive at the sample size.
Table 2
Steps in the AICPA and Firm Decision Aids_______________
AlCPA DECISION AID
1. Determine tolerable misstatement
#. Determine the greater of total 
assets or total revenues.
b. Locate amount “a” in Materiality 
Table
c. Subtract lower bound from “a”.
d. Multiply the result from step “c” by
the factor in the Materiality Table.
e. Add “d” to the minimum planning 
materiality.
f. Multiply planning materiality 
determined in step “e” by 2/3 to 
determine tolerable misstatement.
2. Determine sample size
a. Divide the population book value 
(given in case) by tolerable 
misstatement.
b. Determine the assurance factor 
based on the client's combined 
inherent and control risk and 
planned reliance on other audit 
procedures.
c. To determine the sample size, 
multiply “a” by “b”.
FIRM DECISION AID
1. Determine tolerable misstatement
a. Determine estimated total assets.
b. Determine estimated total revenues, but
not less than total assets.
c. Locate amount "b" in Touchstone Table.
d. Subtract lower bound from "b".
e. Multiply “d” by table factor.
f. Add “e” to the minimum tolerable 
misstatement for the level of total assets 
or total revenues.
2. Determine sample size
a. Divide population book value (given in 
case) by tolerable misstatement.
b. Multiply step “a” by 5.
c. Determine the sample size adjustment 
factor based on the client’s control risk 
and evidence provided from related 
substantive procedures.
d. Determine environmental assessment 
factor from the environmental assessment 
worksheet, based on environmental 
factors and evidence from other audit 
procedures.
e. Subtract the environmental assessment 
factor from the sample size adjustment 
factor, but not less than zero.
f. Multiply the result of step “b” by step “e”.
g. Determine expected aggregate error factor 
based on the expected aggregate error and 
the revised sample size adjustment factor
m ”e”
h.
i.
To determine the sample size, multiply 
“g” b y “f ’.
Round the sample size up to a whole 
number, but not less than ten.
Note; Steps in bold are performed by the auditor. Steps “d” and “g” for determining sample size 
with the firm decision aid are determined by the researcher and the remaining steps are 
mathematically computed by the computer program.
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3.0 Theory and Hypothesis Development
3.1 Decision Aid Reliance
Research has generally shown that individuals are often unwilling to rely 
on decision aids (for example, Ashton 1990,1992; Boatsman et al. 1995; Dawes 
1979; Dawes et al. 1989; Kleinmuntz 1990; Peterson and Pitz 1986; Whitecotton 
1996). Arnold, Collier, Leech, and Sutton (1998) summarize the findings of 
several decision aid reliance studies, finding decision aid reliance by 
inexperienced individuals and mixed evidence for reliance by individuals with 
moderate and high task experience. While some of the research on decision aid 
reliance has used a repeated-measures design (e.g., Ashton 1990), extant research 
may not have captured the full potential of a participant’s learning through the use 
of a decision aid. By not examining decision aid usage over an extended period 
of time, researchers are ignoring a potentially important aspect of the natural 
environment in which judgments are made. Eining, Jones, and Loebbecke (1997) 
suggest that 'th e  influence of decision aids might vary with continued use” and 
that “it would be interesting to examine reliance over an extended time period” 
(1997, 17). Arnold and Sutton (1998) identify three criteria that are critical to 
achieve decision aid reliance by experienced individuals. One of the criteria is the 
user’s familiarity with the decision aid through previous usage.Familiarity with
”  The other two criteria are task complexity and cognitive fit.
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the decision aid provides the potential for the decision aid to become a part of the 
auditor’s decision making process.
3.2 Knowledge Acquisition
Anderson (1980) indicates that individuals systematically acquire 
knowledge. Knowledge may be acquired intentionally or incidentally.
Intentional knowledge acquisition begins when the individual is actively involved 
in learning/memorizing task rules. The process continues with the individual 
deliberately applying the rules to a task until it can be performed with little or no 
conscious effort (i.e., automatic processing). Incidental, or passive, knowledge 
acquisition occurs without conscious effort on the part of the learner (Postman 
1964).
The accounting profession relies heavily on experiential learning to foster 
expertise development (Bonner and Walker 1994; Libby 1995). Decision aids 
represent one opportimity for experiential learning. Ashton and Willingham 
(1988) and Libby and Luft (1993) argue that a structured decision aid facilitates 
task-related learning by providing a model of the knowledge components 
necessary for task completion. However, Glover, Prawitt, and Spilker (1997) 
point out that if the decision aid is used passively, knowledge acquisition may be 
inhibited. Knowledge acquisition would be inhibited by the possible low level 
cognitive processing from passive decision aid use.
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3.3 Hypothesis One
In practice, an auditor potentially acquires two types of knowledge by 
using a decision aid to determine nonstatistical sample sizes. The auditor acquires 
general task knowledge and decision aid specific knowledge, both of which may 
influence how an auditor uses a decision aid in practice. In general, through the 
use of the decision aid, the auditor learns about the task and the criteria the firm 
believes should be considered in the determination of nonstatistical sample sizes. 
In addition, by using a decision aid on multiple occasions, the auditor has the 
potential to learn the structure of the decision aid and to develop an understanding 
of how a particular decision aid works. Specifically, the auditor could be 
expected to learn the required decision aid inputs, the rules that the model applies 
to manipulate the decision aid inputs, and the effect that changing the input 
parameter values has on the decision aid sample size. When the decision aid is 
familiar the auditor may have to apply little or no conscious effort to use the 
decision aid. The ability to complete the task with little or no conscious effort 
reflects an automatic level of processing. The automatic processing of the task 
(i.e., determining a nonstatistical sample size with a decision aid) will lead to 
observable working forward, rather than backward, in the use of the decision aid.
A knowledge structure is not static, it is continually being refined. 
Feedback during the review process provides one basis for the refinement of a 
knowledge structure for the task of determining a nonstatistical sample size. For 
example, an auditor may refine his or her task knowledge structure if superiors 
indicate during review that an inappropriate sample size had been selected.
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A knowledge structure for the task of determining a nonstatistical sample 
size is a prerequisite to working backwards. An existing task knowledge structure 
allows an auditor to calculate an intuitive nonstatistical sample size. The 
knowledge structure may be based on learning from the firm decision aid, 
feedback during review, firm training or other experiences.^ An auditor’s 
knowledge structure guides the search for information and influences how the 
information is combined into a sample size judgment.
When using a new, unfamiliar decision aid the sample size may be 
counterintuitive to the auditor’s nonstatistical sample size based on his or her 
existing knowledge structure. A counterintuitive sample size may occur when 
using an unfamiliar decision aid because an auditor does not have knowledge 
about the decision aid. For example, an auditor would not know how the decision 
aid parameter values would impact the final sample size.
Two factors which may contribute to obtaining a counterintuitive sample 
size with an unfamiliar decision aid are: (1) a lack of familiarity with the verbal 
probability categories used to select the decision aid parameter values, and/or (2) 
a lack of knowledge about the model used to manipulate the decision aid 
parameters into a sample size. If the probability phrases are unfamiliar to the user 
they may not be interpreted as intended by the decision aid developer.^' For 
example, the AICPA may have used the phrase moderate to reflect around 75%
™ Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) encountered a firm effect, whereby the difference between the 
intuitive and decision aid sample sizes was smaller for auditors from a firm that had its own 
nonstatistical sampling decision aid than the difference in the intuitive and decision aid sample 
sizes o f auditors from a firm that did not have a nonstatistical sampling decision aid. They posited 
that this may have occurred because the auditors had internalized their firm’s decision aid.
Appendix D discusses prior research on verbal probability theory.
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reliance on other audit procedures; however, as a result of firm training, the 
auditors may interpret moderate to mean 50%. Because the auditor’s choice of 
verbal probability descriptors, from the assurance factor table, significantly 
impacts sample size the decision aid sample size may be counterintuitive.^ If the 
auditor feels that the sample size is counterintuitive there may be an increased 
level of working backwards with an unfamiliar decision aid.^ Figure 1 depicts 
the difference in how a familiar and an unfamiliar decision aid are used.
Figure 1 
Patterns of Decision Aid Use24
Familiar Decision Aid
Choose Decision Aid Parameters
Unfamiliar Decision Aid
Choose Decision Aid Parameters.
Intuitive Sample Size Intuitive Sample Size Counterintuitive Sample Size -*
^  The sample size may be counterintuitive for several reasons, for example the auditor may not 
believe the sample size corresponds to the desired level of audit assurance.
^  In addition to working backwards because the sample size is counterintuitive to an auditor’s 
knowledge structure sample size, the hierarchical review structure of the audit process may 
influence working backwards. This may occur because the review process increases an auditor’s 
accountability. It is only if an auditor chooses to not work backwards and eliminate a 
counterintuitive sample size that a problem would be discovered in the review process. By 
working backwards this does not imply that the decision aid is wrong, or that it is inappropriate for 
the task, just that the decision aid is inconsistent with the auditor’s knowledge structure which is 
contingent on Arm-specific training, experience and decision aids.
For the auditor with no knowledge of the task the sample size would be accepted, not because 
it was intuitive but because there was no intuitive sample size with which to compare the decision 
aid sample size. The participant selection procedures ensure that all participants are familiar with 
the task.
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As previously mentioned the acquisition of knowledge occurs over time as 
individuals learn the rules for task completion, apply the rules, and eventually are 
able to apply the rules without conscious effort. This discussion of the influences 
of knowledge acquisition and the existence of a knowledge structure on decision 
aid use leads to the following hypothesis presented in the null and alternative 
form;
HIo: Auditors who use an unfamiliar nonstatistical sample size decision
aid are less likely, or equally likely, to observably work backwards 
than auditors who use a familiar nonstatistical sample size decision 
aid.
HI a: Auditors who use an unfamiliar nonstatistical sample size decision
aid are more likely to observably work backwards than auditors 
who use a familiar nonstatistical sample size decision aid.
The preceding hypothesis examines observable differences in the use of 
familiar and unfamiliar decision aids. While we may expect to observe 
differences in the use of familiar and unfamiliar decision aids, the reasons for 
these differences have not been empirically examined. I have posited that a 
reason for observed differences in how familiar and unfamiliar decision aids are 
used can be attributed to learning.
Audit firms do not explicate what an auditor is expected to learn through 
the use of a decision aid. However, Glover et al. (1997) and Rose (1998) point 
out that audit firms expect auditors to leam from the decision aids they use in 
practice. Little research has empirically examined what an auditor does leam 
from a decision aid (Glover et al. 1997; Rose 1998). Glover et al. (1997) point 
out that any potential learning may be inhibited if the decision aid is used
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passively. This firm’s decision aid appears to require active auditor involvement 
through multiple judgment-based decisions. For example, the auditor has to 
actively think about the client’s internal controls and the evidence that will be 
provided by other substantive procedures in order to provide the assessments the 
decision aid requires. This deep level of processing may facilitate incidental 
learning of the decision aid.
3.4 Hypothesis Two
Waller and Felix (1984) suggest that the type of encounter (i.e., instruction 
or direct experience) may affect the knowledge actually acquired. In addition. 
Marchant (1990,23) contends that experiences only provide opportunities for 
learning. As previously mentioned learning may occur either intentionally or 
incidentally. Therefore, an auditor’s knowledge level may depend on the number 
of opportimities they have had to leam from the decision aid.^  ^ it is not possible 
to specify ex ante the number of times an auditor would need to use a decision aid 
to acquire knowledge. Because learning exists along a continuum, participants 
familiar with the firm decision aid may differ in the extent of their decision aid 
knowledge.^^ Hence, an auditor may have a global understanding of the decision 
aid without having specific knowledge of the decision aid components.
^  The auditors will self-report the number o f times they have used their firm’s nonstatistical 
sample size decision aid.
^  Although the auditors may differ in the extent of their decision aid knowledge, it was assumed 
that all auditors who participated in this research would have the requisite knowledge to calculate 
an intuitive sample size.
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To further our understanding of what an auditor learns from a decision aid 
and how decision aid experience leads to knowledge acquisition we can test the 
auditor’s learning of individual decision aid components. By changing an 
individual component of a familiar decision aid, making that component 
unfamiliar, we can test whether the auditor has learned that component of the 
decision aid.*  ^ One way to test whether the auditor has learned about the decision 
aid sample size adjustment factor table is to alter the presentation format of the 
table. For example, the rows and columns of the sample size adjustment factor 
table could be rotated.^^ Although the sample size adjustment factor table has 
been made less familiar, via its rotation, the remainder of the decision aid is 
familiar to the firm’s auditors. Figure 2 indicates the potential paths auditors may 
take to arrive at their intuitive sample size and the implied level of their 
knowledge of the decision aid table knowledge. Figure 2 expands the number of 
decision aid paths an auditor may follow for the familiar decision aid in Figure 1 
at the point of ’choose decision aid parameters.’
^  By making a subtle change to the decision aid it is potentially made incongruent with the 
auditor’s existing knowledge structure. Depending on how well developed the auditor’s existing 
knowledge structure is, the auditor will or will not recognize the change.
^  Metzler and Shepard (1974) presented subjects with pairs o f rotated objects and had the subjects 
indicate whether the objects were the same. They found that the farther the degree of separation of 
the objects, the longer it took the subjects to form and rotate a mental image of the object and 
judge the objects the same. In the current research proposal the auditor will need to compare the 
physical decision aid table displayed on a computer screen to a decision aid table that is potentially 
stored mentally, within a knowledge structure.
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Figure 2
Inset to Figure 1, Choosing Input Factors for a Familiar Decision Aid: 
Paths to Achieve an Intuitive Sample Size When 
 the Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table has been Rotated
A. Choose Sample Size Adjustment Factor
B. intuitive Sample Size (1,4)* C. Counterintuitive Sample Size
D. Chooses a New Sample Size 
Adjustment Factor (3)
E. Chooses a New Sample M  
Size Adjustment Factor (2)
F. Intuitive Sample Size
Level of Implied Knowledge of the Sample Size Adiustment Factor Table
G. Counterintuitive 
Sample Size
(1)No:
(2) Low:
(3) Medium:
(4) High:
These auditors read the row/coluiiui headings to find the 
appropriate factor.
These auditors know the row/column headings; however, they 
do not know the factors. They do not recognize that the table 
is rotated.
These auditors know the row/column headings; however, they 
do not know the factors. When they do not achieve the 
expected sample size they work backwards. They would look 
at the headings, recognize the table has been rotated and find 
the correct factor.
These auditors know the row/column headings, when they do 
not find the expected factor they look at the headings, realize 
the table has been rotated and find the correct factor.________
For the auditor with no knowledge o f the task or the decision aid table, the sample size would be 
accepted, not because it was intuitive; but because, there was no intuitive sample size with which 
to compare the decision aid sample size.
In Figure 2, step A, ‘choose a sample size adjustment factor,’ an auditor 
with a high level of decision aid table knowledge may know that in row 3, column 
2 the sample size adjustment factor is .34. If the sample size adjustment factor 
table had been rotated, when the auditor went to row 3, coliunn 2 the factor would 
be .72. When the expected factor was not found the auditor’s attention would be
23
heightened, causing the auditor to go back and read the row and column headings 
and find the appropriate sample size adjustment factor. This would lead to the 
auditor’s intuitive sample size (Figure 2, step B).^’ Because the auditor with high 
knowledge of the sample size adjustment factor table had to re-read the row and 
column headings, they would spend more time in choosing the sample size 
adjustment factor (Figure 2, step A) than auditors with less knowledge of the 
decision aid table.
Auditors who have a medium level of knowledge will recognize that the 
table is rotated when they work backwards (Figure 2, step D) to resolve the 
difference between the decision aid sample size and their intuitive sample size. 
The auditor will read the row/column headings of the table and realize the table 
had been rotated. The unique combination of a medium knowledge auditor 
working backwards and recognizing the table rotation leads the auditor to 
systematically work backwards. 1 define systematically working backwards as 
the auditor finding the factor that corresponds to the original row/column choice 
(i.e., if the auditor had assessed control risk as moderate and the reliance on other 
audit procedures as moderate, as indicated by row 3 and colunm 2, they would 
now find the correct factor .34 in row 2 and column 3). Therefore, systematic 
working backwards implies that an auditor with a medium level of knowledge of 
the sample size adjustment factor table would work backwards only once.
^  The high knowledge auditor presumably will have internalized the meaning o f the terms used to 
select the sample size adjustment factor. Also, the high knowledge auditor may associate certain 
combinations of terms with a particular sample size output.
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A low level of knowledge of the sample size adjustment factor table will 
cause the auditor to not recognize that the table has been rotated when they work 
backwards in Figure 2, step E. Because the auditor does not recognize that the 
table has been rotated they change the combination of verbal descriptors 
unsystematically to alter the decision aid sample size (Figure 2, step E). The 
auditor who has a low level of knowledge of the table may work backwards 
repeatedly (Figure 2, steps C and E) to achieve an intuitive sample size (Figure 2, 
step F).
Auditors who have no knowledge of the table may never recognize that 
the sample size adjustment factor table has been rotated. A lack of table 
knowledge will require the auditor to read the row/column headings (Figure 2, 
step A). Although the particular decision aid table is unfamiliar, the auditor, 
presumably, has had other experiences within the firm that will allow him or her 
the opportunity to internalize the firm’s intended meaning of the probability 
phrases used to describe control risk and reliance on other substantive procedures. 
Without prior knowledge of the decision aid table, there is not a knowledge 
structure in place with which a comparison to the rotated table can be made. The 
auditor simply works forward through the decision aid and accepts the decision 
aid result.^®
In summary, auditors who have high knowledge or no knowledge of the 
decision aid table will work forward; whereas, the auditors with medium or low 
table knowledge will work backwards. However, it is only the auditors who have
^  This is consistent with Arnold et ai. (1998) who find that inexperienced individuals rely on 
decision aids.
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a medium or high level of knowledge who will correctly identify on the post- 
experimental questionnaire that the sample size adjustment factor table had been 
rotated. These two response variables will be used to classify the auditor’s 
measured level of knowledge. Table 4 shows how the auditor’s measured level of 
knowledge of the sample size adjustment factor table will lead to the four possible 
combinations of the two response variables.
Table 3
Auditor’s Measured Knowledge Level 
of the Familiar Decision Aid Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table
Works Backwards 
with Rotated Table
Doesn’t Work Backwards 
with Rotated Table
Identifies the Table 
Rotation
Medium High
Fails to Identify the Table 
Rotation
Low No
This discussion on knowledge acquisition and its impact on decision aid 
use leads to the following hypotheses in the null and alternative form:
H2o: The auditor’s self-reported level of experience with the decision
aid will not be positively correlated with the auditor’s measured 
knowledge level of the familiar decision aid sample size 
adjustment factor table.
H2g: The auditor’s self-reported level of experience with the decision
aid will be positively correlated with the auditor’s measured 
knowledge level of the familiar decision aid sample size 
adjustment factor table.
Rejecting the null hypothesis will provide insight into what an auditor
learns from this firm’s decision aid, how much experience with the decision aid is
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necessary for such learning to occur, and how the level of knowledge influences 
decision aid use. This hypothesis attempts to investigate the continuum of the 
familiarity dimension that is ignored in the dichotomous analysis of familiarity in 
Hypothesis One.
3.5 Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis Two investigates whether auditors have learned an individual 
component of the firm decision aid (i.e., the sample size adjustment factor table 
from the nonstatistical sampling workpaper). It is possible that an auditor has 
learned the entire process that the decision aid uses to combine the auditor’s 
assessments into a sample size judgment. If this is true, the auditor may know 
how the parameter values combine to form a particular sample size (i.e., the 
auditor may associate particular decision aid inputs with a sample size output).
An auditor who has such a complete understanding of the decision aid could be 
classified as an expert.
It has been shown that experts often solve problems via pattern 
recognition (Ericsson and Smith 1991). If the auditor is an expert in using the 
decision aid, it may be impossible for the auditor to recall the intermediate steps 
the decision aid uses to arrive at sample size. Therefore, the expert may only 
know which combination of decision aid inputs leads to a particular output sample 
size. The auditor may no longer be able to explicate the process that is used to 
transform the assessment of control risk, reliance on other substantive procedures, 
and expected aggregate error into a nonstatistical sample size. Because of this, an
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expert may appear in Figure 2 to have no knowledge of the sample size 
adjustment factor table (i.e., the auditor does not work backwards or identify the 
sample size adjustment factor table rotation). However, unlike an auditor who 
does not have knowledge of the decision aid table, the expert will be more likely 
to accurately specify the decision aid sample size given the client’s control risk, 
the degree of reliance on other substantive procedures, and the expected aggregate 
error rate. Again, the auditor’s level of knowledge presumably depends on 
experience with the decision aid. This leads to the following hypothesis in the 
null and alternative form;
H3o: The auditor’s self-reported level of experience with the decision
aid will not be positively correlated with the accurate selection of 
the familiar decision aid’s sample size given the verbal descriptors 
for the client’s control risk, the degree of reliance on other 
substantive procedures, and the expected aggregate error rate.
H3g: The auditor’s self-reported level of experience with the decision
aid will be positively correlated with the acciuate selection of the 
familiar decision aid’s sample size given the verbal descriptors for 
the client’s control risk, the degree of reliance on other substantive 
procedures, and the expected aggregate error rate.
Hypothesis Three provides an increased understanding of the level of 
knowledge that auditors gain through the use of decision aids.
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4.0 Method
This study uses an experiment, administered via computer, to test the 
hypotheses. The software allows for tracking a participant’s decision processes in 
detail. For example, the program records the time spent on the task, in total, and 
the time spent on each instance of working backwards. The program also records 
which input(s) an auditor changes when working backwards, the number of times 
an auditor worked backwards and the direction of the sample size revision. The 
data set provided by the program allows for a more definitive look at the 
processes that auditors apply when using decision aids. The data set provides 
evidence for the extent of an auditor’s decision aid knowledge.
The experiment has the objectives of determining the process that auditors 
use in applying a decision aid, determining the effect of decision aid familiarity 
on aid use and ascertaining what an auditor learns from a decision aid.
The remainder of this section will include a discussion of the participants, 
design, task, and procedures to be employed.
4.1 Participants
Audit seniors and managers &om a single international accoimting firm 
participated in this experiment during six regularly scheduled training sessions. 
The training sessions were held over four months approximately three weeks 
apart.^' The use of audit seniors and managers facilitates comparisons with 
Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Messier et al. (2001). While the auditors 
were not randomly selected fi'om all audit seniors and managers within the firm, 
they were randomly assigned to the treatment conditions. The proportion of case 
materials distributed at each of the six training sessions was held constant:
Communication about the task among auditors does not appear to be a problem. The training 
session that an auditor participated in was not a significant determinant of working backwards 
(F=1.56, p=.18).
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Condition One, 25%; Condition Two, 50%; Condition Three, 12.5%; and 
Condition Four, 12.5%.
One hundred thirty-four auditors participated in this research study. 
Twenty-four participants were deleted from the data analysis because they entered 
an incorrect amount for ‘Total Assets’ and ‘Total Revenue’ or ‘Population Book 
Value.’ Of the Twenty-four participants that were deleted, 7 were from Training 
Session One, 4 were from Training Session Two, 3 were from Training Session 
Three, 5 were from Training Session Four, 3 were from Training Session Five, 
and 2 were from Training Session Six. Thus, there were 110 useable respondents.
4.2 Research Design
The study uses a 2 X 2 between-participant design. The manipulated 
variables are aid familiarity and table rotation. Table 4 details the experimental 
design. The participants were randomly assigned to one of four possible 
conditions: (1) the firm’s decision aid, (2) the firm’s decision aid with the sample 
size adjustment factor table rotated, (3) the revised AICPA decision 
aid, or (4) the revised AICPA decision aid with the assurance factor table 
rotated.^^
By design, an equal number of auditors were not assigned to each 
Conditions. The design was planned so that when Condition 3 and Condition 4 
were combined they would be approximately equal with Condition 1 for the test 
of Hypothesis One. Condition 2 is larger than the other conditions to allow the
There is no reason to expect a difference in working backwards when auditors use the 
unfamiliar A1CP.\ decision aid with or without a rotated table. Condition 2, the revised AICPA 
decision aid with a rotated table, serves to rule out a plausible alternative explanation that the 
revised AICPA decision aid is not only different, but very different, from the frrm decision aid 
which leads to differential working backwards. For example, the AICPA decision aid presents 
control risk in the rows; whereas, the firm decision aid presents control risk in the columns. If 
there is no difference in the frequency o f working backwards or the sample size o f auditors who 
use the revised AICPA decision aid with or without the table rotated the two conditions will be 
combined for the analyses.
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maximum amount of variance in the auditors’ decision aid experience and
measured knowledge levels of Hypothesis Two.
Table 4 
Experimental Design
Familiar 
Decision Aid
Revised AICPA 
Decision Aid
Non-rotated
Table
Condition 1 
(27 participants)
Condition 3 
(11 participants)
Rotated Table Condition 2 
(59 participants)
Condition 4 
(13 participants)
4.2.1 Dependent Variables
4.2.1.1 Hypothesis One
Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Messier et al. (2001) found that 
auditors worked backwards in the use of an unfamiliar decision aid. However, the 
experimental design did not allow the authors to capture the number of times an 
auditor worked backwards or how many auditors worked backwards. Because it 
is not possible based on prior research to predict the number of times an auditor 
will work backwards the dependent variable for Hypothesis One is the existence 
of working backwards behavior. This is measured as a dichotomous variable, 
depending on whether the auditor does or does not revise the decision aid 
nonstatistical sample size. Hence, the number of times an individual auditor 
works backwards is excluded in the analyses of Hypothesis One.^^
4.2.1.2 Hypothesis Two
Hypothesis Two is a test of the association between the auditor’s
However, Hypothesis Two does consider the number o f times an auditor works backwards. The 
more times an auditor works backwards, the lower the implied level o f knowledge of the 
adjustment factor table.
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measured level of knowledge and the auditor’s decision aid experience. The 
auditor’s measured level of knowledge is a function of the presence or absence of 
(1) working backwards and (2) correct identification of the table rotation on the 
post-experimental questionnaire. The auditors will self-report decision aid 
experience on the post-experimental questionnaire.
In addition to the main association test, time will be used as a dependent 
variable in the additional analysis of Hypothesis Two. It is expected that the 
auditor’s measured decision aid knowledge will significantly affect the amount of 
time the auditor spends looking at the sample size adjustment factor table screen, 
both (I) each time they look at the screen and (2) in total. Therefore, the median 
time is expected to significantly differ between the measured knowledge levels.^ "*
4.2.1.3 Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis Three is also a test of association. The auditors were asked to 
choose, from four alternatives, the familiar decision aid sample size given the 
tolerable misstatement, the verbal descriptors of a client’s control risk, the degree 
of reliance on other substantive procedures, and the expected aggregate error.
The auditor was asked to select the sample size for five different combinations of 
client descriptors. The auditors were scored according to the number of correct 
responses (i.e., 0 to 5). The score is correlated with the auditor’s self-reported 
decision aid experience. A positive relation is expected between experience and 
the accurate specification of the decision aid sample size.
^  The mean time is used in the parametric data analyses contained in Appendix E.
A recognition task was chosen because the sample size must be exactly correct, it is not 
sufficient to be close to the decision aid sample size. However, it is recognized, as Libby and Lipe 
(1992) point out that knowledge differences are more critical in recall than recognition tasks.
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4.3 Task
Appendix A contains the case developed by Kachelmeier and Messier 
(1990), as well as the two post-experimental questionnaires that were developed 
for the current study. The task was to determine a nonstatistical sample size for 
the case presented in Kachelmeier and Messier (1990) and Messier et al. (2001). 
Minor changes in terminology were made in the case to make it consistent with 
firm terminology. It is necessary to use the same case to facilitate comparisons 
between the current work and extant research. As previously mentioned, the 
current study presents the case via computer, whereas, Kachelmeier and Messier 
(1990) and Messier et al. (2001) presented the case in a pencil and paper format.
The case consists of background information and a set of financial 
statements from a manufacturer of small consumer appliances. The account of 
interest is supplies inventory. The auditor’s task is to determine the nonstatistical 
sample size for supplies inventory. The choice of nonstatistical sampling is based 
on the audit manager's recommendation that a nonstatistical sample was desired 
for the subsidiary accounts.
4.4 Procedures
Participants were given a hard copy of the case. The task (i.e., calculating 
a nonstatistical sample size with a decision aid) was provided on a computer 
diskette.^^ The auditors were able to read through the information at their own
^  Although the presentation format differs from that used in practice this is not expected to affect 
the task because the auditors routinely use other computerized decision aids.
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pace. The software tracked the auditor’s decision aid inputs throughout the task.
After the auditors had read through the background material at their own 
pace, they started the computer program. The program prompted the auditor for 
the input factors for either their firm’s decision aid or the AICPA decision aid. 
The computer program performed all mathematical calculations. When all inputs 
had been entered the computer calculated a nonstatistical sample size based on 
either the AICPA decision aid model or the firm decision aid model. The auditor 
was then asked if this is the desired sample size. If it was not the desired sample 
size the auditor was allowed to make changes to the sample size inputs. If the 
auditor made changes he or she was presented with the new sample size 
computation. Again, changes could be made. The number of changes was not 
limited. When the participant indicated satisfaction with the sample size, the 
screen was cleared of the sample size information and the auditor was asked to 
complete the demographic data and answer post-experimental multiple choice 
questions.
34
5.0 Results
The goal of this study was to first document, through process tracing, the 
working backwards behavior indirectly observed by Kachelmeier and Messier 
(1990) and Messier et al. (2001) and to examine the role of experience in auditors' 
propensity to work backwards in the application of a nonstatistical sampling 
decision aid.
The initial plan for analyzing the results of this research was to use 
parametric statistical analysis techniques. However, preliminary analysis of the 
data indicated violations in the assumptions necessary for parametric tests. 
Therefore, the data analysis reported is based, in general, upon nonparametric 
statistical analysis. For the reader interested in the results based upon parametric 
statistics, see Appendix E. The results based upon parametric statistical methods 
are essentially the same as those calculated with nonparametric statistics.
5.1 Hypothesis One
The first hypothesis examined the effect of an auditor’s decision aid 
familiarity on working backwards in the application of the decision aid.^  ^ The 2 
X 2 research design was planned so that Condition 3, the revised AICPA decision 
aid, and Condition 4, the revised AICPA decision aid with a rotated sample size 
adjustment factor table, could be collapsed into a single condition for the data 
analysis. Table 5, Panel A shows the number of auditors who did and did not
^  While it was expected that all participants who received the firm decision aid would be familiar 
with the decision aid subsequent analysis of hypothesis two indicated that a large number o f the 
participants had never used the firm decision aid. Therefore, participants who indicated that they 
had no experience with the decision aid were eliminated from the analysis o f hypothesis one. This 
resulted in the elimination o f 40 participants, thirteen from Condition 1 and twenty-seven from 
Condition 2.
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work backwards in each version of the decision aid. In order to combine 
Condition 3 and Condition 4, as planned, it was necessary to determine whether 
there was a difference in working backwards with the AICPA decision aid in its 
original form and the AICPA decision aid with the rotated sample size adjustment 
factor table. Panel B of Table S presents the results of the planned comparisons. 
The decision to work backwards was not significantly related to the table rotation 
for the AICPA decision aid (Z=.19, p=.42; Ksa=.10, p=.50).^* Based upon visual 
observation of the data it appeared that there was no difference in the propensity 
of auditors to work backwards when using either version of the firm decision aid; 
therefore, this was tested prior to testing Hypothesis One. Similar to the results 
obtained for the two versions of the AICPA decision aid, the sample size 
adjustment factor table rotation did not significantly affect the auditor’s decision 
to work backwards with the firm decision aid (Z=-.37, p=.36). Therefore, both 
versions of the firm decision aid and the AICPA decision aid were pooled for the 
test of Hypothesis One.
The results are reported using the Wiicoxon 2-sample test with a normal approximation. All 
significance values are for one-tailed tests. The data include both large (him decision aid) and 
small (AICPA decision aid) samples. While the Wiicoxon test is more efficient for large samples, 
the Kolmogorov-Smimov test is more efficient for small sample sizes (Siegel and Castellan 1988, 
151). However, for the sake o f consistency, Wiicoxon values are reported in the Tables for both 
large and small sample sizes. The results of Kolmogorov-Smimov tests are reported in the text 
when tqjpropriate for small sample sizes.
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Table S
Observed Working Backwards by Condition
Panel A: Frequency of Working Backwards >y Condition
Firm
Decision Aid 
(Condition 1)
Firm
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Total
Did Not
Work
Backwards
10 21 8 10 49
Did Work 
Backwards
4 11 3 3 21
Total 14 32 11 13 70
Panel B; Planned Comparisons
Firm Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus Firm Decision Aid 
AICPA Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus AICPA Decision Aid
Z
-.37
.19
p-value
.36
.42
Auditors, experienced in the determination of a nonstatistical sample size, 
who used an unfamiliar decision aid were expected to work backwards more often 
than auditors who used a familiar decision aid. Based upon the aforementioned 
finding that the sample size adjustment factor table rotation did not affect working 
backwards. Conditions 1 and 2 were compared with Conditions 3 and 4 for the 
test of Hypothesis One. Table 6, Panel A shows the frequency of working 
backwards in the unfamiliar (AICPA) and familiar (firm) decision aid conditions. 
Panel B of Table 6 shows the statistical results of the planned comparison. The 
results of Hypothesis One indicate that contrary to expectations, auditors who 
used the unfamiliar AICPA decision aid did not work backwards more often than 
the auditors who used the familiar firm decision aid (Z=-.64, p=.26). Therefore, 
Hypothesis One was not supported. Decision aid familiarity did not significantly 
impact the decision to work backwards.
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On average, across all versions of the nonstatistical sampling decision aid, 
thirty percent of the participants worked backwards. While, the significance of 
thirty percent of the auditors working backwards cannot be empirically tested 
from the expected rate of no working backwards using a binomial test, it appears 
evident that this represents a significant proportion of working backwards.
Table 6
Observed Working Backwards between 
Familiar and Unfamiliar Decision Aid Conditions
Panel A: Frequency of Observed Working Backwards
Familiar 
Decision Aid
Unfamiliar
Decision
Aid
Total
Did Not
Work
Backwards
31 (67%) 18 (75%) 49 (70%)
Did Work 
Backwards
15 (33%) 6 (25%) 21 (30%)
Total 46 24 70
Panel B: Planned Statistical Comparison
Familiar Decision Aid versus 
Unfamiliar Decision Aid
Z
-.64
D-value
.26
5.1.1 Implications of working backwards on sample size
Given the propensity of auditors to work backwards it is important to 
assess the implications of the decision to work backwards. The decision to work 
backwards has implications for audit effectiveness and efficiency through the 
substantive sample size. Therefore, it is relevant to discuss the impact of working 
backwards on the decision aid output, sample size.
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The mean initial sample sizes, prior to any working backwards, are shown 
in Table 7, Panel A. Visual observation of the data prompted a statistical 
comparison of the differences in the sample sizes across the decision aid 
conditions. Table 7, Panel B presents the results of the statistical comparisons. 
The initial sample size did not vary significantly between the two versions of the 
firm decision aid (Z=.08, p=.47) or the two versions of the AICPA decision aid 
(Z=.18, p=.43; KSa=.31, p=.50). However, the initial sample size did vary 
significantly between the firm and AICPA decision aids (Z=4.58, p<.000l).
Table 7
Initial Sample Size by Condition
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Initial Decision Aid Sample Size by 
Condition
Firm Decision 
Aid
(Condition 1)
Firm Decision 
Aid with 
Rotated Table 
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Mean Sample 
Size
21.11 21.49 39 37.85
Standard
Deviation
12.67 12.88 18.76 12.5
Minimum 10 10 0 23
Maximum 52 52 70 56
N 27 59 11 13
Panel B: Statistical Comparisons
z p-value
Firm Decision Aid Rotated Table
versus Firm Decision Aid .08 .47
AICPA Decision Aid Rotated Table
versus AICPA Decision Aid .18 .43
Both versions of the Firm Decision Aid
versus both versions of the AICPA
Decision Aid 4.58 <.0001
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Tables
Final Sample Size by Condition
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Firm Decision 
Aid
(Condition 1)
Firm Decision 
Aid with 
Rotated Table 
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Mean Sample 
Size
19.59 20.27 35.45 37.85
Standard
Deviation
10.66 12.21 22.45 12.50
Minimum 10 10 0 23
Maximum 44 52 70 56
N 27 59 11 13
Panel B: Statistical Comparisons
Z p-value
Firm Decision Aid Rotated Table
versus Firm Decision Aid .04 .48
AICPA Decision Aid Rotated Table
versus AICPA Decision Aid -.06 .48
Both versions of the Firm Decision Aid
versus both versions of the AICPA
Decision Aid 4.47 <.0001
In addition to the initial sample sizes, the final sample sizes, after any 
working backwards, were compared. Table 8, Panel A presents the mean final 
sample sizes by condition, while Panel B presents the results of the statistical 
comparisons. The results were similar to those observed in comparing the initial 
sample sizes. The final sample size did not vary significantly between the two 
versions of the firm decision aid (Z=.04, p=.48) or the two versions of the AICPA
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decision aid (Z=-.6, p=.48; KSa=.48 , p=.49). However, the final sample size did 
vary between the firm and AICPA decision aids (Z=4.47, p<.0001). Given the 
range of potential sample sizes of the firm and AICPA decision aids (see foomote 
17), it was expected that the firm decision aid may result in a smaller mean 
sample size than the AICPA decision aid. This is consistent with a reduced 
dependence on substantive sampling by audit firms.
Table 9
Mean Change in Sample Size Due to Working Backwards by Condition
Firm Decision 
Aid
(Condition 1)
Firm Decision 
Aid with 
Rotated Table 
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Mean Initial 
Sample Size 
for Auditors 
Who Worked 
Backwards
25.00 23.05 47.00 31.67
Mean Final 
Sample Size 
for Auditors 
Who Worked 
Backwards
19.88 19.42 34.00 31.67
Mean Change 
in Sample 
Size Due to 
Working 
Backwards
<5.12> <3.63> <13.00> 0.00
Note: The mean change in sample size was not significantly different fi’om zero 
for any of the Conditions.
Table 9 shows the effect that working backwards had on the mean 
sample size for each condition. Although the net change between the initial and 
final sample sizes across all conditions was a decrease, it is interesting that 9
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auditors reported in the post-experimental questionnaire that they thought the 
initial sample size was too low. Four of the nine auditors successfully worked 
backwards to increase the sample size. Three of the four who successfully 
worked backwards were in Condition 2, while the fourth auditor was in Condition 
3. Of the five auditors who were unsuccessful in increasing the initial sample 
size, three were in Condition 2 and their sample size remained imchanged. Of the 
remaining two, one was in Condition 1 and one was in Condition 2, the effect of 
working backwards for these two auditors was a reduction in the final sample 
size.
Table 10 shows the number of auditors by condition who worked 
backwards to increase and decrease the initial decision aid sample size. The total 
of 21 auditors is different from the total number of auditors who were observed to 
have worked backwards because 12 auditors who actually worked backwards 
reported in the post-experimental questionnaire that they were satisfied with the 
initial sample size.
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Table 10
Direction of Working Backwards by Condition
Firm
Decision Aid 
(Condition 1)
Firm
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Total
Worked 
Backwards 
to Increase 
Sample 
Size
0 4 1 0 5
Worked 
Backwards 
to Decrease 
Sample 
Size
3 5 0 0 8
Worked
Backwards,
Sample
Size
Unchanged
0 5 1 2 8
Total 3 14 2 2 21
5.1.2 Sample Size Comparisons to Extant Research
The final AICPA decision aid sample size in this study can be compared 
to that observed by Messier et al. (2001). Table 11, Panel A provides descriptive 
statistics for the data in this study and the Messier et al. (2001) study. Panel B of 
Table 11 provides a statistical comparison of the results from this study and those 
reported in Table 1 of Messier et al. (2001). The results indicate no significant 
difference (t=,3091, p=.7588) in the final sample size of auditors who used the
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two versions of the AICPA decision aid in this study and the auditors who used 
the AICPA decision aid in the Messier et al. (2001) study.
Table 11
Comparative Sample Size Statistics for the 
Current Study and Messier et al. (2001)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Messier et al. 
(2001)
AICPA Decision 
Aid This Study
Firm Decision Aid 
This Study
Mean Sample Size 35.5 36.75 20.06
Standard
Deviation
9.1 17.38 11.69
Minimum Sample 
Size
22 0 10
Maximum Sample 
Size
53 70 53
N 22 24 86
Panel B: Planned Comparison
Messier et al. Versus Both 
Versions of AIPCA 
Decision Aid this Study
t-statistic
.3091
p-value
.7588
5.1.3 Implications of Working Backwards on Audit Effectiveness
One of the primary inputs into both the Firm and AICPA decision aid is 
the control risk assessment. The decision to work backwards has implications for 
audit effectiveness and efficiency through the reliance on tests of controls. The 
assessed level of control risk should be dependent on the number of key controls 
that auditors assumed had been tested. Therefore, the number of controls tested 
should be a significant determinant of the decision aid sample size. The two
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variables should be negatively correlated because testing controls reduces the 
need for substantive sampling if the controls are found to be operating 
effectively.^^ Therefore, the correlation between the final decision aid sample 
size and the number of controls that auditors indicated they had assumed were 
tested was computed. The correlation was negative and significant (Spearman 
correlation coefficient, -.181, p=.04, normal approximation). However, this is 
primarily the result of Condition 2, the modified firm decision aid (Spearman 
correlation coefficient, -.276, p=.028). While the correlation was negative in 
Condition 1, the firm decision aid. Condition 3, the AICPA decision aid, and 
Condition 4, the modified AICPA decision aid, the results were not significant 
(p>.20).
Because working backwards may have had an effect on the relation, 
between the number of controls tested and sample size, similar analyses were 
conducted on the initial sample sizes. The results indicate that the initial decision 
aid sample size and the number of controls assumed tested were significantly 
negatively correlated (Spearman correlation coefficient, -.246, p=.0089, normal 
approximation). However, this result is primarily the result o f Condition 1, the 
firm decision aid in original form (Spearman correlation coefficient, -.304, p=.06) 
and Condition 2, the modified firm decision aid (Spearman correlation coefficient, 
-.35, p=.01, normal approximation). The AICPA decision aid conditions were not 
significant. For Condition 3, the AICPA decision aid in original form, the 
correlation was positive and insignificant (Spearman correlation coefGcient .063,
”  The case indicated that the controls were operating as described.
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p>.25). In Condition 4, the modified AICPA decision aid, the correlation was 
negative and insignificant (Spearman -.04, p>.10).
These results taken together with the primary test of Hypothesis One 
indicate that audit effectiveness may be harmed by the auditors decision to work 
backwards in the application of the nonstatistical sampling decision aid. 
Hypothesis One found that across all conditions thirty percent of the auditors 
worked backwards; therefore, working backwards is not eliminated through 
decision aid familiarity. The additional analysis found that by working backwards 
the auditors were reducing or eliminating the significant, negative relation that 
should exist between the number of controls tested and the decision aid sample 
size. Therefore, it is apparent that audit effectiveness may be compromised by the 
auditor’s decision to work backwards in the application of the nonstatistical 
sampling decision aid.
5.2 Hypothesis Two
The second hypothesis tested whether auditors had acquired knowledge of 
the Firm’s nonstatistical sampling decision aid by having auditors use a familiar 
(Firm) decision aid that had one key input, the sample size adjustment factor 
table, rotated and then having the auditors identify the potential difference in a 
multiple choice question contained in the post-experimental questionnaire. Recall 
from Table 4 that the auditor’s measured level of knowledge was dependent on 
the presence or absence of the classification variables ‘working backwards’ and 
‘identification of the table rotation’. Each participant was assigned a knowledge 
score from 1, ‘no knowledge,’ to 4, ‘high knowledge’ based on whether he or she
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worked backwards and correctly reported the recognition of the sample size 
adjustment factor table rotation/® Hypothesis Two predicted that an auditor’s 
measured level of knowledge was positively correlated with the number of 
experiences an auditor had had with the decision aid. Table 12 details the number 
of participants by knowledge score and the number of times they had used the 
Firm's manual nonstatistical sampling decision aid.
Table 12
Manual Decision Aid Experience by Knowledge Score
Knowledge Score
Number of
Times
participant
had used
Manual
Decision
Aid
No
Knowledge
Low
Knowledge
Medium
Knowledge
High
Knowledge Total
0 13 4 3 5 25
1 6 1 0 2 9
2 1 0 1 1 3
3 I 0 0 0 1
4 1 1 0 0 2
5 2 0 I 1 4
10 2 1 0 0 3
11 0 1 0 0 1
12 0 1 0 0 1
20 2 1 1 0 4
25 0 1 0 0 1
30 0 0 0 1 1
55 0 1 0 0 1
Total 28 12 6 10 56
40 Three participants were eliminated from this analysis because they failed to answer question 11 
on the demographic questionnaire, “Was there anything different, other than the computerization, 
from the sample program (workpaper) used today and the Firm’s manual sampling workpaper 
and/or CBEAM sampling program routinely used in practice?” Therefore, a knowledge score 
could not be computed for these participants.
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Contrary to expectations, experience with the manual decision aid was not 
significantly related to the knowledge score (Kruskal-Wallis Test, Chi-Square 
approximation, CH1SQ=6.15, p=.45). However, a significant limitation of this 
analysis was the large number of participants, 45%, who had never used the firm's 
manual nonstatistical sampling decision aid. Based on prior research it was 
expected that audit seniors and managers would be familiar with the task; 
however, for this sample of participants this does not appear to be a valid 
assumption. Therefore, I examined whether other experiences within the firm 
may contribute to an auditor's knowledge score. While not significant, the 
number of months that an auditor had held their current rank was more significant 
in explaining the participant’s knowledge score (Kruskal-Wallis Test, Chi-Square 
Approximation, CHISQ=15.58, p=.28). In addition, while not significant, the 
number of months that an auditor had been employed with the firm was more 
significant in explaining the relation with the participant’s knowledge score 
(Kruskal-Wallis Test, Chi-Square Approximation, CHISQ=20.99, p=.20).
As an additional test of Hypothesis Two the time that participants viewed 
the sample size adjustment factor table screen was analyzed for differences in the 
median processing time. The first time the screen was opened it was expected 
that only auditors with a high level of knowledge would recognize the table 
rotation. By recognizing the table rotation, high knowledge auditors would have 
the table screen open for longer than auditors with less knowledge o f the table. 
Figure 3 displays the time that the participants viewed the sample size adjustment 
factor table the first time through. The expected outcome was not observed
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(Median 2-sample test, Z=0, p=.50). The ten auditors classified as high 
knowledge viewed the screen for a median time (standard deviation) of 198.S 
(101.57) seconds while the 46 auditors with medium, low or no knowledge scores 
viewed the screen for a median time (standard deviation) of 211 (150.33) 
seconds/'
Figure 3
Plot of Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table Viewing Time the 
First Time Through: High and All Other Knowledge Level Auditors
I
I  High 1^
 All 
"S Others
•  «♦
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 6000
Time in Seconds
It was expected that auditors classified as having either moderate or low 
knowledge would work backwards, opening the sample size adjustment factor 
table screen a second time. The second time the screen was opened, auditors with 
moderate knowledge would have the screen open longer than low knowledge 
auditors as they searched to discover what led to a coimterintuitive sample size. 
Figure 4 displays the time that medium and low knowledge participants viewed 
the sample size adjusunent factor table the second time through. Although the
The mean time that auditors classified as high knowledge spent viewing the sample size 
adjustment factor table screen the first time through was 208.9 seconds. The mean viewing time 
for all other knowledge levels was 228.61 seconds.
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results of this test were not significant (Median 2-Sample test, Z=-.97, p=.166, 
normal approximation) the means were in the correct direction. The medium 
knowledge score auditors viewed the table for a median time (standard deviation) 
of 20.0 (48.78) seconds while the low knowledge score auditors viewed the table 
for a median time (standard deviation) of 20.0 (26.03) seconds.'*^
Figure 4
Plot of Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table 
Viewing Time the Second Time Through: Medium and Low Knowledge
Level Auditors
&
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In addition, the total time the sample size adjustment factor table screen 
was opened was analyzed using three planned comparisons for a difference in the
"  The mean time that auditors classified as medium knowledge spent viewing the sample size 
adjustment Actor table screen the second time through was 40 seconds. The mean viewing time 
for auditors classified as low knowledge was 26 seconds.
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total processing time between the measured knowledge levels. It was expected 
that the total time would vary depending on the participants’ measured knowledge 
levels. For example, moderate and low knowledge auditors would work 
backwards leading to a total task time that exceeded that of high and no 
knowledge auditors. In addition, because the low knowledge level auditors work 
backwards repeatedly, the total time would exceed the total time of auditors with 
a moderate knowledge level. Figure 5 displays the total time that participants 
viewed the sample size adjustment factor table screen by knowledge level. Figure 
6, Panel A shows the mean total sample size adjustment factor table viewing time 
by knowledge score. The comparative statistics are given in Figure 6, Panel B. 
The results are reported using the Kolmogorov-Smimov statistic, which is more 
powerful than the Median-Test (Siegel and Castellan 1988,151). While the mean 
times were generally in the expected direction all of the results were not 
significant.
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Figure 5
Plot of Total Time Viewing the Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table by
Knowledge Level
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Figure 6
Relationship Between the Mean Total Sample Size Adjustment Factor Tahle 
Viewing Time and the Measured Knowledge Levels
Panel A: Mean (Median) Total Table Viewing Time by Knowledge Level
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5.3 Hypothesis Three
The third hypothesis examined the extent of an auditor’s knowledge of the 
firm decision aid by comparing the auditor’s selected sample size based on 
tolerable misstatement, the verbal descriptors of the client’s control risk, the 
degree of reliance on other substantive audit procedures, and the expected error 
rate, to the sample size implied by the familiar decision aid based on the same 
verbal descriptors. Therefore, Hypothesis Three tested the auditor’s knowledge of 
the complete decision aid. This is different from Hypothesis Two, which
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examined the effect of knowledge acquired on one component of the familiar 
decision aid. In Hypothesis Two, the auditor selected only the sample size 
adjustment factor. On the other hand, Hypothesis Three had auditors select the 
decision aid sample size using a multiple choice question, without actually using 
the decision aid. For example, the first question on Part 11 of the Post- 
Experimental Questionnaire was:
1. If the control risk is assessed at moderate and there is moderate
evidence provided by other substantive procedures, the sample size
is
A. 10
B. 16
C. 22
D. 41
E. Other______
It was expected that experience with the decision aid, either in manual or 
computerized form, would allow subjects to choose the same sample size as 
would be provided by the decision aid based on the same verbal descriptors of the 
control risk and reliance on other audit procedures. Therefore, participants with 
more decision aid experience should match the decision aid sample size more 
often than participants with less decision aid experience. However, contrary to 
expectations, manual decision aid (Kruskal-Wallis Test, Chi-Square 
Approximation, CH1SQ= 12.49, p=.32) or computer decision aid (Kruskal-Wallis 
Test, Chi-Square Approximation, CH1SQ=19.8, p=.27) experience were not 
significant in explaining the number of correct sample size matches. Therefore, 1 
examined whether other experiences within the firm were significantly related to 
the number of correct responses an auditor achieved. The number of months that
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an auditor had been with the firm and the number of months that an auditor had 
held their current rank were not significant in explaining the number of correct 
responses (p=.27, Kruskal-Wallis Test).
Although the post-experimental questions were designed to test for an 
exact match between the correct sample size and the auditor’s chosen sample size, 
it appears relevant to also test whether decision aid experience allows the auditor 
to closely approximate the decision aid sample size. Therefore, a difference score 
was calculated for the net difference between the decision aid sample size and the 
auditor’s sample size summed across the five multiple choice questions. The net 
difference was then correlated with manual decision aid experience. As would be 
expected more experience with the decision aid leads to a lower total difference 
(Spearman correlation coefficient -.19, p=.03).
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6.0 Conclusions
A significant body of research has amassed in the development of audit 
decision aids. Research has documented an unwillingness of knowledgeable 
individuals to subjugate their professional judgment and decision making 
responsibility to a decision aid. Working backwards is one way that auditors can 
demonstrate an unwillingness to rely on a decision aid. If auditors routinely work 
backwards to circumvent the decision aid this may mitigate the potential benefits 
of decision aids. However, one potential benefit of decision aids is increased 
consensus in decision making and the auditors in this study were able to reduce 
the variance in the decision aid sample size by working backwards.
It is important to understand how auditors use decision aids to improve 
audit practice. This study contributes to the study of audit decision aids in three 
ways. First, the results from this research contribute to our understanding of how 
auditors use decision aids. Previous research has not directly demonstrated how 
auditors use decision aids that are a required part o f the audit workpapers. This 
research finds that approximately thirty percent of auditors work backwards to 
alter the decision aid sample size. Therefore, the firm may need to assess the 
potential effect of this behavior on audit risk. For example, this study finds that 
when the auditors worked backwards there was no longer a significant negative 
relation between the number of controls assumed tested and the nonstatistical 
sample size. If the firm is aware of working backwards in the use of this decision 
aid, steps can be taken to either change the way the aid is used or additional ways
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can be sought to minimize the potential increased level of audit risk/^
Second, the results provide evidence that familiarity with the decision aid 
does not affect working backwards. Auditors were equally likely to work 
backwards when they used their own firm's decision aid and when they used the 
unfamiliar AICPA decision aid. However, a number of auditors indicated they 
had little or no experience using the nonstatistical sampling workpaper in either 
its paper or computerized form. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the firm 
decision aid was familiar to this sample of auditors.
Third, the study provides evidence on what auditors learn through the use 
of decision aids. Given that thirty percent o f the auditors worked backwards they 
presumably felt that the decision aid sample size was not congruent with their 
intuitive sample size. Because so few of the auditors had experience with the 
manual or computer nonstatistical sampling decision aid they must have had other 
experiences that allowed them to form an intuitive sample size. It is possible that 
the auditor acquires this knowledge through general audit experience within the 
firm. The association between time at rank and the measured knowledge score 
was as strong or stronger than the association of decision aid experience and 
measured knowledge score. Hypothesis Two.^ In addition, the correlation 
between time at rank and time with the firm and the total number of correct 
answers to the multiple choice questions in part 2 of the post-experimental
The Grm could attempt to change the way the decision aid is used in a number of ways. For 
example, the match between the decision aid and the decision aid user could b t improved by 
altering the decision aid or by providing the auditors with additional training.
** The value for the Mantel-Haenszel association between time at rank and the measured 
knowledge level was 2.032, p=.154; while the value for the Mantel-Haenszel association of 
decision aid experience and the measured knowledge score was .127, p=.722 (manual decision aid 
experience) and .30, p=.584 (computer decision aid experience).
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questionnaire was as strong or stronger than the association of decision aid 
experience and the total number of correct answers to the multiple choice 
questions in part 2 of the post-experimental questionnaire, Hypothesis Three/^ It 
is apparent from the results of this research that a great deal of what auditors learn 
comes from general audit experience rather than from specific experiences with 
the decision aid.
In conclusion, the results of this investigation provide the audit firm with 
tangible evidence with which they can make informed decisions about the 
continued use of the firm’s nonstatistical sampling decision aid. The first step to 
such an evaluation would be to assess the costs to the firm of working backwards 
and the potential benefits of eliminating working backwards. The nonstatistical 
sample size decision aid currently available within the firm is part of the 
computerized audit software. Therefore, it would be relatively simple to modify 
the program to require additional justification if the auditor works backwards.
There are two potential caveats to keep in mind when interpreting the 
results of this research. First, the auditors that participated in this research were 
from a single international audit firm. Auditors from other firms may or may not 
exhibit the same propensity to work backwards. Second, it is not possible to say 
that working backwards, in and of itself, is good or bad. For example, an auditor 
may work backwards to correct an error in the initial calculation of sample size.
The value for the Mantel-Haenszel association lietween time at rank and total correct was .053, 
p=.819, and the value for the Mantel-Haenszel association between time with the Firm and total 
correct was 1.262, p=.261 ; while the value for the Mantel-Haenszel association of decision aid 
experience and total correct was .003, p=.95S (manual decision aid experience) and 1.476. p=224 
(computer decision aid experience).
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Working backwards becomes detrimental when it adversely affects audit risk or 
results in audit inefficiencies.
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7.0 Future Research
Future research should continue to focus on other factors that may 
contribute to an unwillingness of knowledgeable decision makers to rely on a 
decision aid and how those influences can be mitigated. There are three key 
directions for future research. First, method changes could be made. Second, 
examining the design of the decision aid may prove fruitful. Finally, the focus of 
the research could change to determine the costs o f working backwards.
The method could be changed in several ways. The sample could be 
expanded to include other firms that have a nonstatistical sampling workpaper.
The propensity to work backwards with a familiar decision aid may be firm- 
specific. Second, the focus could be changed to examine a cross-section of firm- 
specific decision aids. Working backwards may be a specific bias within the 
nonstatistical sampling decision aid or it may be an individual bias that affects the 
use of multiple familiar decision aids. Third, a field study could be conducted. 
Given that the firm decision aid is computerized within this firm, with the 
addition of a process tracing program, working backwards could be traced across 
a larger sample of auditors working on actual audit clients. Also, several auditors 
indicated that they did not work with manufacturing clients or had little or no 
experience with the decision aid. Future researchers could improve the match 
between the task and the participant’s experience through improved pre-screening 
participant selection procedures rather than relying on post-experimental 
classification. Finally, a limitation of this study was that auditors were only asked 
how many key controls were tested in the post-experimental questionnaire.
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Future research could be enhanced by asking participants which controls they had 
assumed were tested prior to selecting a sample size adjustment factor/^ By 
doing so participants would need to justify deviations from the initial sample size 
adjustment factor when working backwards. In addition, participants could be 
asked to list which key controls had been tested and the assumed results of testing 
those controls.'”
The specific design of the decision aid could be examined for ways in 
which it contributes to working backwards. First, both the firm and AICPA 
nonstatistical sampling decision aids make use of verbal probability phrases to 
characterize the control risk, inherent risk and the reliance on other substantive 
procedures. Verbal probability phrases have been shown to exhibit a great deal of 
variability in interpretation. Therefore, future research may need to consider the 
role that this previously untested linguistic variable may play in working 
backwards. Second, the decision aid used in the current study, as well as the firm 
decision aid used in practice is computerized. By nature of the computerization it 
may be easier for the auditors to work backwards, because it requires only a click 
or two of the mouse. Therefore, it may be interesting to discover whether 
individuals who work backwards with a computerized decision aid are equally 
likely to work backwards with a decision aid that requires the auditor to manually
^  Auditors may or may not test the same controls for a particular audit assertion. It may be that 
auditors differ in the weight they apply to each test of control for its ability to reduce control risk. 
Therefore, it may not be how many controls are tested but which controls are tested that reduces 
control risk. In addition, auditors may have difficulty translating the results of testing controls into 
a verbal probability phrase describing the control risk assessment.
”  The current case simply stated that all controls appeared to be operating as described.
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make the required computations. Computerization may also be a factor that 
inhibits learning because much of the task is unobservable.
Finally, future research should focus on determining the costs of working 
backwards. The auditors are expending time to work backwards. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to determine whether the time spent working backwards is 
offset by a reduced cost for sampling. Second, several auditors in this study 
worked backwards to increase the sample size. If the increased sample size 
results in audit inefficiency it is necessary to determine the costs of this 
inefficiency. Lastly, this study found that the final sample size was not 
significantly related to the number of controls tested, which the case indicated 
were operating as described. This finding may indicate that the firm is exposing 
itself to an increased audit risk.
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Appendix A 
Case Materials 
MODERN PRODUCTS CO IPORATION
You have been assigned to the audit of M 
(Modern), a manufacturer of various parts for sm 
Unadjusted amounts for Modem's balance sheet 
audit period, calendar year 1999, are as follows:
adem Products Corporation 
ill consumer appliances, 
md income statement for the
Modem Products Coq oration 
Balance Sheet 
(in thousands)
Assets 
Current assets:
Cash $ 3.402
Accounts receivable 10,231
Inventory o f  manufactured goods 10,264
Inventory o f  supplies 3.758
Total current assets $27,655
Property, plant & equipment, net
o f  accumulated depreciation 20,072
Other assets 3.056
Total assets $50.783
abilities & Stockholders’ Equity
abilities:
Current liabilities $10,571
Long-term debt 15.222
Total liabilities $25,793
Stockholders' Equity:
Capital stock 8,032
Retained earnings 16.958
Total stockholders’ equity $24.990 
Total liabilities &
stockholders’ equity $50.783
Modern Products Cor; lormtion 
Income Statement 
(in thousands)
Sales
Cost of sales 
Gross Profit
Selling & Administrative expense^
Net Income before taxes 
Provision for taxes 
Net income
Net income has been relatively stable in t 
the past several years.
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$25,494
15.341
$10,153
5.032
5,121
2.356
$2.765
le range of $2 - $4 million for
For purposes of this case, your attention is directed to the $3,758,000 
balance of supplies inventory. It is considered material to the financial statements 
taken as a whole. This amount represents the total of a series of similar sized 
subsidiary accounts representing supplies on hand for any needed repairs of 
equipment used in manufacturing operations. Corporate management maintains a 
significant inventory of such supplies in order to minimize the risk of lengthy 
unproductive “down time” attributable to equipment failure. The supplies 
inventory consists o f approximately 6,000 different parts and components.
For audit purposes, the inventory of supplies is considered material to the 
financial statements taken as a whole, but is not so critical to warrant formal 
statistical analysis. Accordingly, the audit manager considers it sufficient to 
apply nonstatistical (judgmental) sampling to supporting subsidiary records. For 
each sample item selected, the following substantive audit procedures will be 
performed to primarily test the existence and valuation assertions;
1. Physically inspect the actual inventory of the sample item comparing 
both identifying information and the quantity on hand to perpetual 
inventory records.
2. Ascertain that sample items are not obsolete or otherwise useless.
3. Reconcile recorded balances of sample items to supporting purchase 
invoices and disbursement vouchers, verifying accurate pricing.
4. Ascertain that inventory has been accurately deducted from inventory 
ledgers on a first-in, first-out (FIFO) basis, which is the company’s 
inventory policy.
Since many supply inventory items are at remote locations, it is 
anticipated that physical inspection will be fairly time consuming. Further, 
pricing tests for some high volume parts and components could involve 
considerable audit effort. It is therefore desirable to keep the sample size at a 
minimum, while still obtaining reasonable assurance as to the accuracy of 
recorded balances. Thus, you want to use an efficient, highly stratified approach 
that focuses on high volume, high dollar amount parts and components.
This study requests your judgment as to certain characteristics which 
would be used in determining the extent of the above audit tests of the supplies 
inventory account. Accordingly, you should consider the following background 
information.
Internal Control Structure
Modem Products maintains computerized perpetual records for its 
supplies inventory accounts. The perpetual records can be accessed through 
computer terminals or personal computers connected to the company’s network. 
The following exhibit shows an example of the information displayed.
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Part Number: 473368
Description: Orifice For Stratman Pump #907b 
Location: Warehouse E
Quantity Amount
DATE P.O.# REQ.# UNIT
COST
ADD DEL BAL DEBIT CREDIT BALANCE
4/3/94 Balance
Forward
7 @ 43.92 
16 @47.02
23 1,059.76
4/22/94 4-505 5 @ 43.92 5 18 219.60 840.16
5/9/94 5-219 2 @ 43.92 
I &. 47.02
3 15 134.86 705.30
6/29/94 6-872 5 @47.02 5 10 235.10 470.20
7/15/94 7-61 20 @49.80 20 30 996.00 1.466.20
9/30/94 9-850 5 @ 47.02 5 25 235.10 1,231.10
Purchases of supplies are entered (added) into the client’s perpetual 
records at cost, with reference to the supporting purchase order number. Purchase 
orders are maintained in sequential files, must be signed by the person requesting 
the purchase, and approved by both the appropriate line manager and the 
corporate treasurer’s office. When supplies are used, a requisition order (also 
sequentially numbered) is completed by the person requesting the supplies, and 
entered (credited) into the client’s perpetual records on a FIFO basis after 
approval by an authorized line manager. Inventory is never released unless a 
requisition form has been completed by a line manager.
Physical controls over inventory warehouses include the company that 
only authorized warehouse personnel are allowed inside the warehouses; 
supervisors requesting supplies must obtain the requested items at designating 
receiving gates.
Finally, perpetual inventory records are summarized into account totals at 
the end of each month, and ten percent of all subsidiary ledger postings are traced 
back to the supporting purchase orders and requisitions by accounting staff 
(separate from those who maintain the inventory records) to verify accuracy and 
proper authorization.
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New Controls
As the result of immaterial misstatements discovered during last year’s 
audit (see below), the client has implemented two control procedures 
recommended in our prior-year letter to client management.
First, client staff now performs periodic physical counts of selected 
inventory items througliout the year as time permits, verifying quantities shown in 
the perpetual records. Such counts are performed by administrative personnel 
independent of the inventory recordkeeping department, and any noted 
discrepancies are promptly investigated and corrected.
Second, the client now supplements the sample checking of perpetual 
inventory postings to requisition forms and purchase orders with a “reverse” 
check from the files of requisition and purchase orders to the perpetual inventory 
records for ten percent of such documents, randomly selected. This supplemental 
procedure is performed to help ensure that all requisitions and purchase orders are 
posted.
Client staff documents both of the above controls by preparing a report of 
the records checked.
Tests of Controls
Our tests of controls indicate that control procedures appear to be 
operating as described.
Nature of Other Substantive Tests
Detail accounts maintained for each type of supply inventory will enable 
fairly comprehensive analytical procedures to test the reasonableness of recorded 
balances. In addition, year-end cut-off procedures should ensure that all 
purchases made around the year-end date have been properly recorded.
Expectation of Misstatements
Results from last year’s similar audit test of supplies inventory showed a 
moderate number of physical count errors, usually understatements, which 
amounted to 1-1.5% of the account balance. It was speculated that some 
requisition forms were not being posted to the perpetual inventory ledgers. 
However, client management has stressed to us that the new control procedures 
implemented this year should have mitigated the problem.
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire-Part I
1. Job Code:_______
2. Gender:
A. Male
B. Female
3. How long have you been with Grant Thornton? years months
4. How long have you held your current rank?_______years______ months
5. How many courses have you had in sampling?
 University courses Firm courses (National and local) Non-Firm courses
6. Approximately how many times have you used your firm’s nonstatistical 
substantive sample workpaper(i.e., the actual paper document)? [Please 
provide a numerical quantity rather than a verbal descriptor such as 
*many* or *few.’l ________ times
7. Approximately how many times have you used your firm’s nonstatistical 
substantive sample computer program included in CBEAM? [Please provide 
a numerical quantity rather than a verbal descriptor such as many’ or 
‘few.’l ________ times
8. What are the key steps for calculating a nonstatistical substantive sample?
9. How effective do you believe the Firm’s manual sampling workpaper and/or 
CBEAM sampling program are in calculating an appropriate nonstatistical 
sample size? [Please put a slash (/) on the scale below.]
I---------1_.
Not
Effective
- i - - I -
Very
Effective
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10. How confident are you in your ability to judge the appropriateness of the 
nonstatistical substantive sample size determined by either the Firm’s manual 
sampling workpaper and/or the CBEAM sampling program? [Please put a 
slash (/) on the scale below.]
I— I— I— I— I— I— I
Not Very
Confident Confident
11. Was there anything different, other than the computerization, from the sample 
program (workpaper) used today and the Firm’s manual sampling workpaper 
and/or CBEAM sampling program routinely used in practice? (Circle all that 
apply.)
A. yes, the dollar value of tolerable misstatement
B. yes, the sample size adjustment factor table was rotated
C. yes, the sample size adjustment factor table values
D. yes, the entire workpaper was different
E. no, there was nothing different
F. other_____________________________
12. Please provide a numerical quantity of the number of key controls you 
assumed had been tested. ________ key controls
13. Were you satisfied with the initial sample size that you calculated with the 
work paper?
Yes (skip to question 15) No
14. If you were not satisfied with the initial sample size, was the sample size
a. too small
b. too large
15. How often have you changed you risk assessments to recompute the initial 
nonstatistical sample size determined using either the Firm’s manual sampling 
workpaper or CBEAM sample program? [Please put a slash (/) on the scale 
below]
Not Very
Often Often
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16. How similar was Modem Products Corporation, the case client you evaluated 
today to those you routinely encounter in practice? [Please put a slash (/) on 
the scale below.]
I------1------1------1------1------1------1
Not Very
Similar Similar
17. How often do you encounter clients with characteristics similar to Modem 
Products Corporation, the case client? [Please put a slash (/) on the scale 
below.]
I------1------1------1------1------1------ 1
Not Very
Often Often
18. Where you interrupted while completing the task? [Circle one.]
Yes, minutes No
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire-Part II
The questions on the following page are intended to assess your knowledge of the 
Firm’s nonstatistical substantive sample workpaper under various combinations of 
control risk and the amount of evidence provided by related substantive 
procedures. Because these questions are being asked to assess your knowledge of 
the Firm’s workpaper you have not been provided with the Firm’s workpaper.
You should not use any materials (e.g., the Firm’s workpaper, the Firm’s 
CBEAM sampling program, or the sample program used with today’s case) other 
than a calculator to complete these questions.
For each of the questions, assume that you are responsible for determining the 
nonstatistical sample size for the supplies inventory account. The book value of 
the supplies inventory account is $3,758,000.
The following additional information is available to aid in your sample size 
determination:
1. There are no individually significant items.
2. As in the past, a stratified will be computed this year.
3. Based on last year’s audit, the expected level of aggregate error is 1,5% of 
Touchstone.
4. Touchstone is $280,000.
5. The environmental assessment factor is .11.
You should circle the sample size that you believe would be computed using the 
Firm’s manual sampling workpaper of CBEAM sample program under the given 
combination of control risk and the amount of evidence provided by related 
substantive procedures. In addition, all Firm policies with respect to the 
minimum sample size requirements are in effect as you answer the following five 
questions.
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1. If the control risk is assessed at moderate and there is moderate evidence 
provided by other substantive procedures, the sample size is
A. 10
B. 16
C. 22
D. 41
E. Other_______
2. If the control risk is assessed at moderate and there is limited evidence 
provided by other substantive procedures, the sample size is
A. 10
B. 16
C. 22
D. 28
E. Other_______
3. If the control risk is assessed at limited and there is maximum evidence 
provided by other substantive procedures, the sample size is
A. 10
B. 16
C. 22
D. 28
E. Other_______
4. If the control risk is assessed at slightly below maximum and there is limited 
evidence provided by other substantive procedures, the sample size is
A. 28
B. 37
C. 44
D. 50
E. Other_______
5. If the control risk is assessed at slightly below maximum and there is 
significant evidence provided by other substantive procedures, the sample size 
is
A. 10
B. 22
C. 28
D. 37
E. Other
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Appendix B 
AlCPA Decision Aid
Compute the required nonstatistical sample size for the detailed test of the
6,000 different parts and components that comprise the supplies inventory just 
described. Your computation should be based on the following nonstatistical 
sample size model suggested by the AICPA.
Population Book Value 
Sample Size ~ X  Assurance Factor
Tolerable Misstatement
Since the population’s recorded amount is known to be $3,758,000, you 
only need to assess the tolerable misstatement and the assurance factor. These 
terms are defined by the AICPA as follows:
Tolerable Misstatement
Tolerable misstatement is the monetary misstatement in the account 
balance or class of transactions that may exist without causing the specific 
financial statement assertion to be materially misstated. Please use the AICPA’s 
materiality worksheet to calculate tolerable misstatement.
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WORKSHEET FOR CALCULATING PLANNING MATERIALITY 
AND TOLERABLE MISSTATEMENT
Client:___________
Balance Sheet Date:
1. IDENTIFY AND ESTIMATE BASE
Base Amount: $_
total revenues)
(greater of total assets or
2. CALCULATING PLANNING MATERIALITY
Use the following table to calculate planning materiality.
Larger of Total Revenues 
Or Total Assets Is:
Over
But Not 
Over
Planning
Materiality
Is:
+ Factor X Excess Over
$0 S30 thousand SO + .0593 X SO
30 thousand 100 thousand 1,780 + .0312 X 30 thousand
ICO thousand 300 thousand 3,960 + .0215 X 100 thousand
300 thousand I million 8,260 + .0145 X 300 thousand
I million 3 million 18,400 + .00995 X 1 million
3 million 10 million 38,300 + .00674 X 3 million
10 million 30 million 85,500 + .00461 X 10 million
30 million 100 million 178,000 + .00312 X 30 million
100 million 300 million 396,000 + .00215 X 100 million
300 million 1 billion 826,000 + .00145 X 300 million
1 billion 3 billion 1,840,000 + .000995 X 1 billion
3 billion 10 billion 3,830,000 + .000674 X 3 billion
10 billion 30 billion 8,550,000 + .000461 X 10 billion
30 billion 100 billion 17,800,000 + .000312 X 30 billion
100 billion 300 billion 39,600,000 + .000215 X 100 billion
300 billion 82,600,000 + .000148 X 300 billion
CALCULATE TOLERABLE MISSTATEMENT
Tolerable misstatement can be calculated using the following “rule of 
thumb:”
Tolerable Misstatement = Planning Materiality X 2/3
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Assurance Factor
An assurance factor is one of twelve values, depending on your 
assessment of the combination of inherent/control risk, and on your assessment 
that other substantive procedures (e.g., analytical procedures) designed to test the 
same assertions will fail to detect a material misstatement in a particular assertion. 
The AICPA’s instructions for determining the assurance factor are as follows;
1. Classify your assessment of the combination of inherent and control risk.
a) Maximum -  the auditor has assessed control risk at the maximum for 
the particular assertions.
b) Slightly below maximum -  the auditor has support for the belief that 
internal control structure policies and procedures are somewhat 
effective at preventing or detecting material misstatements in the 
particular assertions.
c) Moderate -  the auditor has support for the belief that internal control 
structure policies and procedures are moderately effective at 
preventing or detecting material misstatements in the particular 
assertions.
d) Low -  the auditor has support for the belief that internal control 
structure policies and procedures are highly effective at preventing or 
detecting material misstatements in the particular assertions.
1. Classify your assessment that the risk that other substantive procedures
designed to test the same assertions will fail to detect a material
misstatement in the particular assertions.
a) Maximum -  no other substantive procedures are performed that are 
designed to test the same assertions.
b) Slightly below Maximum
c) Moderate -  other substantive procedures designed to test the same 
assertions are performed that are expected to be moderately effective 
in detecting material misstatements in those assertions.
d) Low -  other substantive procedures designed to test the same 
assertions are performed that are expected to be highly effective in 
detecting material misstatements in those assertions.
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1. Based on these judgments, detennine the iq}propriate assurance factor
from the following table;
Assurance Factors for Nonstatistical Sampling Formula
ASSESSMENT 
OFCONTROL 
RISK (AND 
INHERENT RISK)
RELIANCE ON OTHER RELEVANT AUDITING 
PROCEDURES
Maximum SBM Moderate Low
Maximum 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.0
Slightly below 
maximum
2.7 2.4 2.0 1.6
Moderate 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.2
Low 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.0
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Appendix C
Probability-Proportional-tO'Size (PPS) Sampling
Probabiiity-Proportional>to-Size (PPS) Sampling is a statistical sampling 
technique that is used to reach conclusions about the dollar amount of the 
population. The theory underlying PPS sampling is attribute sampling theory; 
whereby, conclusions about the population are made based on a rate of 
occurrence. PPS sampling gives every dollar in the population an equal chance of 
being sampled. However, an auditor would not examine just a single dollar of an 
account balance or a transaction. For example, the auditor would examine the 
entire account balance for the supply subsidiary ledger for part number 473368, 
“Orifice for Stratman Pump #907b” or the auditor would examine the entire 
transaction to purchase a new building. Therefore, the larger the account balance 
of the subsidiary ledger or the transaction amount, the more likely it is to be 
selected for examination by sampling.
PPS sampling offers a number of advantages over the other common 
statistical sampling technique classical variables sampling. A key advantage of 
PPS sampling is that it does not require the auditor to directly consider the 
variation in the dollar amounts of the population. This is an advantage because 
classical variables sampling (CVS) requires the auditor to either know or estimate 
the standard deviation of the population; therefore, CVS may require a pilot 
sample. A second advantage to PPS is that it automatically stratifies the sample, 
therefore larger dollar items (which if misstated are more likely to cause a 
material misstatement) have a higher probability of being examined. In addition, 
all items that exceed the sampling interval will be examined. Third, when no
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misstatements are expected PPS results in a smaller sample size than CVS.
Finally, a sample examined with PPS sampling can begin before the entire 
population is available. Because the variance in the population does not need to 
be known and any items added to the population will be examined according to 
the same sampling interval.
There are also several disadvantages or special considerations that an 
auditor must make in using PPS sampling. First, PPS assumes that balances are 
positive. Therefore, if the auditor feels it is important to test zero or negative 
account balances PPS is not an appropriate method because these balances will 
not be subject to selection for examination. Second, if the auditor expects or 
identifies understatements in the population, the evaluation of the sampling results 
will require special consideration. Third, if misstatements are discovered PPS 
sampling evaluation may overstate the risk of a Type II error, rejecting the 
population value when it was actually acceptable. Finally, the PPS sample size 
may exceed that of the CVS sample size depending on the expected amount of 
misstatement in the population.
To illustrate the PPS sampling method, the following abbreviated example 
is taken from the AICPA (1999) Audit Sampling Auditing Practice Release page 
75. The auditor was designing a test to examine the commercial loans receivable 
reported balance of $5 million. Based on the assessment of the client the auditor 
determined tolerable misstatement to be $55,000. Further, the auditor assessed 
control risk at maximum and determined the appropriate risk of incorrect 
acceptance was 10 percent. In designing the sample the auditor used an expected
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misstatement o f $10,000. Therefore, the sampling interval was determined as 
follows:
Tolerable misstatement $55,000
Expected misstatement $ 10,000
Multiplied by expansion factor
for a 10 percent risk of incorrect
acceptance (Table D.2, p. 110) x 1.5
Less expected effect of misstatements 15.000
Tolerable misstatement adjusted for
expected misstatements $40,000
Divided by reliability factor for no 
expected misstatements for a 
10 percent risk of incorrect acceptance
(Table D .l, p. 109) 2.31
Sampling interval $17.316
The sample size is then calculated by dividing the population value of $5 million
by the sampling interval of $17,316; therefore, the sample is 289.'** The auditor
then manually selected the sample using an adding machine in the following
manner:
1. He cleared the adding machine.
2. He subtracted a random start between $ 1 and $17,316, inclusive.
3. He began adding the recorded amounts of logical units in the 
population, obtaining a subtotal after the addition of each succeeding 
logical unit. The first logical unit that made the subtotal zero or 
positive was selected as part of the sample.
4. After each selection, he subtracted the sampling interval of $17,316 as 
many times as necessary to make the subtotal negative again.
5. He continued adding the logical units as before, selecting all items that 
caused the subtotal to become zero or positive.
41 However, because 3 account balances exceed the sampling interval the actual sample size was 
281 customer balances.
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The primary difference between statistical and nonstatistical sampling is 
that the former requires the quantification of sampling risk and the latter does not. 
The Nonstatistical Sampling decision aid contained on pages 47-60 and 105-108 
of the AICPA Audit Sampling Auditing Practice Release is based on the attributes 
sampling theory underlying the PPS statistical sampling method (AICPA 1999, 
52). Both PPS and nonstatistical sampling do not directly consider variation in 
the population. While PPS sampling indirectly considers variation by sampling 
all items that exceed the sampling interval, nonstatistical sampling relies on the 
auditor’s judgment to appropriately stratify the sample. In both methods the 
auditor must consider the tolerable misstatement^^ and frequency of expected 
misstatements. The PPS sampling method statistically adjusts for the risk of 
incorrect rejection, prior to determining the sampling interval and sample size.
The nonstatistical sample size decision aid indirectly incorporates sampling risk in 
the ‘Assurance Factor,’ which is the auditor’s professional judgment with regard 
to the combined inherent risk and control risk, as well as, “the risk that other 
substantive procedures designed to test the same assertion will fail to detect a 
material misstatement” (AICPA 1999, 53).
A decision aid for the calculation of tolerable misstatement is contained on pages 1 OS-108 o f the 
1999 AICPA A u d it  S a m p iin g  Auditing Practice Release.
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Appendix D 
Verbal Probability Theory
For over 30 years psychologists and others have been studying verbal 
probability theory (see, Hakel 1968; Lichtenstein and Newmann 1967). Verbal 
probabilities are intended to convey a range rather than a precise meaning.^° A 
great deal of research has amassed demonstrating that individuals use verbal 
phrases imprecisely to convey quantitative information (see for example, Amer, 
Hackenbrack, and Nelson 1994; Brun and Teigen 1988; Budescu and Wallsten 
1985; Reimers 1992)*'. It has been found that between-subject variability 
exceeds within-subject variability (Beyth-Marom 1982; Budescu and Wallsten 
1985). While most research has simply asked subjects to apply numerical ranges 
to multiple verbal phrases other research has tried to pinpoint the underlying 
cause of the variability in the numerical assessment of verbal phrases. The effect 
of elicitation method has been studied (Hamm 1991 ; Teigen and Brun 1999).
Also, the effect of context has been tested in basic and applied settings (Boettcher 
1995; Brun and Teigen 1988; Bryant and Norman 1980; Reagan, Mosteller, and 
Youtz 1989; for an overview, see Pepper 1981).
Different contexts may invoke different schema leading to differences in 
the interpretation of verbal probability phrases. For example. Brun and Teigen 
(1988) examined the effect of context and found that the subject’s familiarity with 
the context and the desirability of the outcome influenced the interpretation of the
This is in contrast to a numerical probability that conveys a precise meaning. For example, if 
something is said to occur 30% of the time, then over an extended number of observations we can 
expect the event to occur one-half o f the time.
Verbal phrases may be used to express probability (i.e., ‘possibly,’ ‘probably,’ or ‘perhaps’) or 
to express frequency information (i.e., ‘sometimes,’ ‘often,’ or ‘fi^uently’). Empirical research 
has examined probability and frequency phrases both together and separately with similar results.
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probability terms. In addition, context may “lead to higher between subject 
variability than when the terms are judged in isolation, presumably because the 
interpretation of probability terms tends to be correlated with the judges’ personal 
opinion on the topic” (390).
A paradoxical finding of several studies is that individuals prefer to 
receive information numerically (Erev and Cohen 1990; Murphy, Lichtenstein, 
Fischoff, and Winkler 1980) while they prefer to provide quantitative information 
with verbal phrases (Erev and Cohen 1990). One reason that has been given for 
the latter finding is accountability. “(N)umbers are perceived as conveying a 
level of precision and authority that people do not want to associate with their 
opinions” (Budescu, Weinberg and Wallsten 1988,281). As Erev and Cohen 
(1990) further explain, the vagueness of verbal probability phrases reduces the 
chance of being punished for being wrong.
Amer et al. (1994) provide an accounting example on the effect of 
numerical interpretation of verbal probability phrases in an audit task. They had 
audit managers interpret probability phrases used by a senior concerning the 
collectability of accounts' receivable. While their results provide evidence of 
between-person variability in the interpretation of verbal probabilities, they do not 
pinpoint the exact nature of the variability. The variability may be the result of 
the interpretation of the verbal probability descriptors or it may reflect an 
allowance for tlie difference in meaning another person attaches to a probability 
phrase. Amer et al. (1994) recognize that their verbal probability interpretation
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task may result in numerical assessments that are different from one's own 
numerical meaning of a specific probability phrase.
Physicians, political analysts, meteorologists and accountants are just a 
few of the many professionals that must deal with uncertainty in communicating 
information to others. For these and other professionals variability in the 
interpretation of verbal phrases does not pose a significant problem unless it 
results in different decisions among individuals. Very little research has focused 
on the effect of verbal probability phrases on decision making (Budescu, 
Weinberg and Wallsten 1988).
Decision aids are one means of improving the consistency of decision 
making across individuals (Bonner et al. 1996; Einhom 1972). However, audit 
decision aids provided by the audit firms and the AICPA often make use of verbal 
probability descriptors to convey quantitative information, this may mitigate the 
desired increase in consistency. The interpretation of these verbal descriptors is 
most often left to professional Judgment.*^ However, a problem occurs when a 
difference in the interpretation of the verbal descriptors results in a different 
decision.
Both the Firm and AICPA nonstatistical sampling decision aid use verbal 
probability descriptors to characterize the reliance on other audit procedure, 
control risk and inherent risk. These verbal descriptors, such as 'moderate' and 
slightly below maximum' are intended to convey a range of numerical
”  While it is most often not the case, SFAS #109 paragraph 17 provides a numerical 
quantification o f  more likely than not,' this represents one way to eliminate the effect o f variance 
in the interpretation o f the verbal probability phrases.
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probabilities. However, it is not clear that these descriptors are intended to cover
the entire range fiom 0*100%; nor is it clear that they are intended to convey
equal ranges of numerical probabilities.
Variability in the interpretation of the verbal probability descriptors may
lead auditors, who assess the same audit client, to assign different verbal
probability descriptors to the same numerical probability (i.e., 85% may be within
the 'moderate' range for one auditor and within the range conveyed by 'slightly
below maximum' to another auditor). An individual’s professional judgment,
with regard to sample size, may be inconsistent with the probability ranges
intended by the decision aid creators. Therefore, the imprecision of the verbal
probability descriptors may be a contributory factor to working backwards.
Consider the following example:
An auditor determines control risk to be 5% and classifies this as 
maximum.' The auditor also determines that there is a 15% risk that other 
audit procedures, testing the same assertion, will fail to detect a material 
misstatement and classifies this as 'low.' Using the AICPA decision aid 
the indicated sample size is 34. However, if the auditor's intuitive sample 
size is 40, the auditor may work backwards to increase the indicated 
sample size. By changing the risk of other substantive procedures failing 
to detect a material misstatement to moderate,' the indicated sample size is 
increased to 39 which is closer to the auditor's intuitive sample size. This 
scenario is in contrast to an auditor who assessed the same client similarly, 
but initially applied the verbal probability label 'moderate' to the risk that 
other substantive procedures would fail to detect a material misstatement.
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Appendix E 
Results of Parametric Data Analysis
Hypothesis One
The first hypothesis examined the effect of an auditor’s decision 
aid familiarity on working backwards in the application of the nonstatistical 
sampling decision aid/^ The 2 X 2  research design was planned so that Condition 
3, the revised AICPA decision aid, and Condition 4, the revised AICPA decision 
aid with the rotated sample size adjustment factor table, could be collapsed into a 
single condition for the data analysis. Table 13, Panel A shows the number of 
auditors who did and did not work backwards in each version of the decision aid. 
In order to combine Condition 3 and Condition 4, as planned, it was necessary to 
determine whether there was a difference in working backwards with the AICPA 
decision aid in its original form and the AICPA decision aid with the rotated 
sample size adjustment factor table. Panel B of Table 13 presents the results of 
the plaimed comparisons. The decision to work backwards was not significantly 
related to the table rotation for the AICPA decision aid (F=.05, p=.8281). Based 
upon visual observation of the data it appeared that there was no difference in the 
propensity of auditors to work backwards when using either version of the firm 
decision aid; therefore, this was tested prior to testing Hypothesis One. Similar to 
the results obtained for the two versions of the AICPA decision aid, the sample 
size adjustment factor table rotation did not significantly affect the auditor’s 
decision to work backwards with the firm decision aid (F=.15, p=.7011). 
Therefore, both of the versions of the firm decision aid and the AICPA decision
While it was expected that all participants who received the firm decision aid would be familiar 
with the decision aid subsequent analysis o f hypothesis two indicated that a large number o f the 
participants had never used the firm decision aid. Therefore, participants who indicated that they 
had no experience with the decision aid were eliminated from the analysis o f hypothesis one. This 
resulted in the elimination o f 40 participants, thirteen from Condition I and twenty-seven from 
Condition 2.
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aid were pooled for the test of Hypothesis One.
Table 13
Observed Working Backwards by Condition
Panel A: Frequency of working backwards by Condition
Firm
Decision Aid 
(Condition 1)
Firm
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Total
Did Not
Work
Backwards
10 21 8 10 49
Did Work 
Backwards
4 11 3 3 21
Total 14 32 11 13 70
Panel B: Planned Comparisons
Firm Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus Firm Decision Aid 
AICPA Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus AICPA Decision Aid
F-value
.15
.05
D-value
.7011
.8281
Auditors, experienced in the determination of a nonstatistical sample size, 
who used an unfamiliar decision aid were expected to work backwards more often 
than auditors who used a familiar decision aid. Based upon the aforementioned 
finding that the sample size adjustment factor table rotation did not affect working 
backwards. Conditions 1 and 2 were compared with Conditions 3 and 4 for the 
test o f Hypothesis One. Table 14, Panel A shows the frequency of working 
backwards in the unfamiliar (AICPA) and familiar (firm) decision aid conditions. 
Panel B of Table 14 shows the statistical results of the planned comparison. The 
results o f Hypothesis One indicate that contrary to expectations, auditors who
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used the unfamiliar AICPA decision aid did not work backwards more often than 
the auditors who used the firm's decision aid (Two-tail Fisher’s Exact Test .974). 
On average, across all versions of the decision aid, 30% of the participants 
worked backwards. Therefore, Hypothesis One was not supported. Decision aid 
familiarity did not significantly impact the decision to work backwards.
Table 14
Observed Working Backwards between 
Familiar and Unfamiliar Decision Aid Conditions
Panel A: Frequency of Observed Working Backwards
Familiar 
Decision Aid
Unfamiliar
Decision
Aid Total
Did Not
Work
Backwards
31 (67%) 18 (75%) 49 (70%)
Did Work 
Backwards
15 (33%) 6 (25%) 21 (30%)
Total 46 24 70
Panel B: Planned Statistical Comparison
Familiar Decision Aid versus 
Unfamiliar Decision Aid
F-value
.42
p-value
.52
Implications of working backwards on sample size
Given the propensity of auditors to work backwards it is important to 
assess the implications of the decision to work backwards. The decision to work 
backwards has implications for audit effectiveness and efficiency through the 
substantive sample size. Therefore, it is relevant to discuss the impact of working 
backwards on the decision aid output, sample size.
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The mean initial sample sizes, prior to any working backwards, are shown 
in Table 15, Panel A. Visual observation of the data prompted a statistical 
comparison of the differences in the sample sizes across the decision aid 
conditions. Table IS, Panel B presents the results of the statistical comparisons. 
The initial sample size did not vary significantly between the two versions of the 
firm decision aid (F=.01, p=.9034) or the two versions o f the AICPA decision aid 
(F=.04, p=.8346). However, the initial sample size did vary significantly between 
the firm and AICPA decision aids (F=29.21, p=.0001).
Table 15 
Initial Sample Size by Condition
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Initial Sample Size by Condition
Firm Decision 
Aid
(Condition 1)
Firm Decision 
Aid with 
Rotated Table 
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Mean Sample 
Size
21.11 21.49 39 37.85
Standard
Deviation
12.67 12.88 18.76 12.5
Minimum 10 10 0 23
Maximum 52 52 70 56
N 27 59 11 13
Panel B: Planned Comparisons
Firm Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus Firm Decision Aid 
AICPA Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus AICPA Decision Aid 
Both versions of the Firm Decision Aid 
versus both versions of the AICPA 
Decision Aid
F-value
.01
.04
29.21
p-value
.9034
.8346
.0001
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In addition to the initial samples, the final sample sizes, after any working 
backwards, were compared. Table 16, Panel A presents the mean final sample 
sizes by version, while Panel B presents results o f the statistical comparisons.
The results were similar to those observed in comparing the initial sample sizes. 
The final sample size did not vary significantly between the two versions of the 
firm decision aid (F=.05, p=.8261) or the two versions of the AICPA decision aid 
(F==.20, p=.6594). However, the final sample size did vary between the firm and 
AICPA decision aids (F=28.94, p=.0001). Given the range of potential sample 
sizes of the firm and AICPA decision aids (see footnote 17), it was expected that 
the firm decision aid may result in a smaller mean sample size than the AICPA 
decision aid. This is consistent with a reduced dependence on substantive 
sampling by audit firms.
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Table 16 
Final Sample Size by Condition
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Firm Decision 
Aid
(Condition 1)
Firm Decision 
Aid with 
Rotated Table 
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Mean Sample 
Size
19.59 20.27 35.45 37.85
Standard
Deviation
10.66 12.21 22.45 12.50
Minimum 10 10 0 23
Maximum 44 52 70 56
N 27 59 11 13
Panel B: Planned Comparisons
Firm Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus Firm Decision Aid 
AICPA Decision Aid Rotated Table 
versus AICPA Decision Aid 
Both versions of the Firm Decision Aid 
versus both versions of the AICPA 
Decision Aid
F-value
.05
.20
28.91
p-value
.8261
.6594
.0001
Table 17 shows the effect that working backwards had on the mean 
sample size for each condition. Although the net change between the initial and 
final sample sizes across all conditions was a decrease, it is interesting that 9 
auditors reported in the post-experimental questionnaire that they thought the 
initial sample size was too low. Four of those auditors successfully worked 
backwards to increase the sample size. Three of the four who successfully 
woriced backwards were in Condition 2, while the fourth auditor was in Condition
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3. Of the five auditors who were unsuccessful in increasing the initial sample 
size, three were in Condition 2 and their sample size remained unchanged. Of the 
remaining two, one was in Condition 1 and one was in Condition 2, the effect of 
working backwards for these two auditors was a reduction in the final sample 
size.
Table 17
Mean Change in Sample Size Due to Working Backwards by Condition
Firm Decision 
Aid
(Condition I)
Firm Decision 
Aid v.ith 
Rotated Table 
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision A id 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Mean Initial 
Sample Size 
for Auditors 
Who Worked 
Backwards
25.00 23.05 47.00 31.67
Mean Final 
Sample Size 
for Auditors 
Who Worked 
Backwards
19.88 19.42 34.00 31.67
Mean Change 
in Sample 
Size Due to 
Working 
Backwards 
backwards
<5.12> <3.63> <13.00> 0.00
Note: The mean c lange in sample size was not significant or any of the Conditions.
Table 18 shows the number of auditors by condition who worked
backwards to increase and decrease the initial decision aid sample size. The total
of 21 auditors is different from the total number of auditors who were observed to
have worked backwards because 12 auditors who actually worked backwards
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reported in the post-experimental questionnaire that they were satisfied with the 
initial sample size.
Table 18
Direction of Working Backwards by Condition
Firm
Decision Aid 
(Condition 1)
Firm
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 2)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
(Condition 3)
AICPA 
Decision Aid 
with Rotated 
Table
(Condition 4)
Total
Worked 
Backwards 
to Increase 
Sample 
Size
0 4 1 0 5
Worked 
Backwards 
to Decrease 
Sample 
Size
3 5 0 0 8
Worked
Backwards,
Sample
Size
Unchanged
0 5 1 2 8
Total 3 14 2 2 21
Sample Size Comparisons to Extant Research
The final AICPA decision aid sample size in this study can be compared 
to that observed by Messier et al. (2001). Table 19, Panel A provides descriptive 
statistics for the data in this study and the Messier et al. (2001) study. Panel B of 
Table 19 provides a statistical comparison of the results from this study and those 
reported in Table 1 of Messier et al. (2001). The results indicate no significant 
difference (t=.3091, p=.7588) in the final sample size of auditors who used the
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two versions of the AICPA decision aid in this study and the auditors who used 
the AICPA decision aid in the Messier et al. (2001) study.
Table 19
Comparative Sample Size Statistics for the 
Current Study and Messier et al. (2001)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Messier et al. 
(2001)
AICPA Decision 
Aid This Study
Firm Decision Aid 
This Study
Mean Sample Size 35.5 36.75 20.06
Standard
Deviation
9.1 17.38 11.69
Minimum Sample 
Size
22 0 10
Maximum Sample 
Size
53 70 53
N 22 24 86
Panel B: Planned Comparisons
Messier et al. Versus Both 
Versions of AIPCA 
Decision Aid this study
t-statistic
.3091
p-value
.7588
Implications of Working Backwards on Audit Effectiveness
One of the primary inputs into both the firm and AICPA decision aid is the 
control risk assessment. The decision to work backwards has implications for 
audit effectiveness and efficiency through the reliance on tests o f controls. The 
assessed level of control risk should be dependent on the number of key controls 
that auditors assumed had been tested. Therefore, the number o f controls tested 
should be a significant determinant of the decision aid sample size. The two
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variables should be negatively correlated because testing controls reduces the 
need for substantive sampling if the controls are found to be operating 
effectively.*** Therefore, the correlation between the final decision aid sample 
size and the number of controls that auditors indicated they had assumed tested 
was computed. While there was a negative correlation (Pearson correlation 
coefficient, -.12551) the relationship was not significant (p=.2281). The 
correlation of each condition was tested as well. While each of the conditions 
exhibited a negative correlation between the final sample size and number of 
controls tested, none of the results were significant (p>. 16).
Because working backwards may have had an effect on the relation 
between the number of controls tested and sample size, similar analyses were 
conducted on the initial sample sizes. The results indicate that the initial decision 
aid sample size and the number of controls assumed tested were significantly 
negatively correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient, -.2262, p=.0284).
However, this result is primarily the result of Condition 1, the firm decision aid in 
original form (Pearson correlation coefficient, -.33854, p=.1056) and Condition 2, 
the modified firm decision aid (Pearson correlation coefficient, -.23911, p=.1017). 
In Conditions 3 and 4, the AICPA decision aid, the initial sample size and the 
number of controls tested were negatively correlated the results were not 
significant (p>.6055).
^  The case indicated that the controls were operating as described.
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These results taken together with the primary test of Hypothesis One 
indicate that audit effectiveness may be harmed by the auditors decision to work 
backwards in the application of the nonstatistical sampling decision aid.
Hypothesis Two
The second hypothesis tested whether auditors had acquired knowledge of 
the firm’s nonstatistical sampling decision aid by having auditors use a familiar 
(firm) decision aid that had one key input, the sample size adjustment factor table, 
rotated and then having the auditors identify the potential difference in a multiple 
choice question contained in the post-experimental questionnaire. Recall from 
Table 4 that the auditor's measured knowledge level was dependent on the 
presence or absence of the classification variables ’working backwards’ and 
‘identification of the table rotation.’ Each participant was assigned a knowledge 
score from 1, ‘no knowledge,’ to 4, ‘high knowledge’ based on whether he or she 
worked backwards and correctly reported the recognition of the sample size 
adjustment factor table rotation.”  Hypothesis Two predicted that an auditor’s 
measured level of knowledge was positively correlated with the number of 
experiences an auditor had had with the decision aid. Table 20 details the number 
of participants by knowledge score and the number of times they had used the 
firm's manual nonstatistical sampling decision aid.
”  Three participants were eliminated from this analysis because they foiled to answer question 11 
on the demographic questionnaire, “Was there anything different, other than the computerization, 
from the sample program (workpaper) used today and the Firm’s manual sampling workpaper 
and/or CBEAM sampling program routinely used in practice?” Therefore, a knowledge score 
could not be computed for these participants.
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Contrary to expectations, experience with the manual decision aid was not 
significantly related to the knowledge score (p=.662, Two-tail Fisher's Exact 
Test). A Fisher's Exact Test rather than a Chi-Square was used because 96% of 
the cells have expected counts of less than 5. However, a significant limitation of 
this analysis was the large number of participants, 45%, who have never used the 
firm's manual decision aid. Based on prior research it was expected that audit 
seniors and managers would be familiar with the task; however, for this sample of 
participants this does not appear to be a valid assumption. Therefore, I examined 
whether other experiences within the rum may contribute to an auditor's 
knowledge score. While not significant, the number of months that an auditor had 
held their current rank was more significantly correlated with the participant’s 
knowledge score (p=.124. Two-tail Fisher's Exact Test) than manual decision aid 
experience.
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Table 20
Manual Decision Aid Experience by Knowledge Score
Knowledge Score
Number of
Times
participant
had used
Manual
Decision
Aid
No
Knowledge
Low
Knowledge
Medium
Knowledge
High
Knowledge Total
0 13 4 3 5 25
1 6 I 0 2 9
2 I 0 1 1 3
3 1 0 0 0 1
4 1 1 0 0 2
5 2 0 1 1 4
10 2 1 0 0 3
11 0 1 0 0 I
12 0 1 0 0 1
20 2 1 1 0 4
25 0 1 0 0 1
30 0 0 0 1 1
55 0 1 0 0 1
Total 28 12 6 10 56
As an additional test of Hypothesis Two the time that participants viewed 
the sample size adjustment factor table screen was analyzed for differences in the 
mean processing time. The first time the screen was opened it was expected that 
only auditors with a high level of knowledge would recognize the table rotation. 
By recognizing the table rotation, high knowledge auditors would have the table 
screen open for longer than auditors with less knowledge of the table. The 
expected outcome was not observed (F=.394, p=.6951). Figure 7 displays the 
time that the participants viewed the sample size adjustment factor table the first
102
time through. The ten auditors classified as high knowledge viewed the screen for 
a mean (standard deviation) of 208.9 (101.57) seconds while the 46 auditors with 
medium, low or no knowledge scores viewed the screen for a mean (standard 
deviation) of 228.61 (150.33) seconds.
Figure 7
Plot of Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table Viewing Time the 
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It was expected that auditors classified as having either moderate or low 
knowledge would work backwards, opening the sample size adjustment factor 
table screen a second time. The second time the screen was opened, auditors with 
moderate knowledge would have the screen open longer than low knowledge 
auditors as they searched to discover what led to a counterintuitive sample size.
Figure 8 displays the time that medium and low knowledge participants viewed 
the sample size adjustment factor table the second time through. Although the 
results of this test were not significant (t=.6939, p=.4977) the means were in the 
correct direction. The medium knowledge score auditors viewed the table for a 
mean (standard deviation) o f40.0 (48.78) seconds while the low knowledge score
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auditors viewed the table for a mean (standard deviation) of 26.00 (26.03) 
seconds.
Figure 8
Plot of Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table 
Viewing Time the Second Time Through: Medium and Low Knowledge
Level Auditors
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In addition, the total time the sample size adjustment factor table screen
was opened was analyzed using an ANOVA with three planned comparisons for a
difference in the mean processing time between the measured knowledge levels.
It was expected that the total time would vary depending on the participants’
measured knowledge levels. For example, moderate and low knowledge auditors
would work backwards leading to a total task time that exceeded that of high and
no knowledge auditors. In addition, because the low knowledge level auditors
work backwards repeatedly, the total time would exceed the total time of auditors
with a moderate knowledge level. Figure 9 displays the total time that
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participants viewed the sample size adjustment factor table screen by knowledge 
level. Figure 10, Panel A shows the mean total sample size adjustment factor 
table viewing time by knowledge score. The comparative statistics are given in 
Figure 10, Panel B. While the results were generally in the expected direction 
they were not significant.
Figure 9
Plot of Total Time Viewing the Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table by
Knowledge Level
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Figure 10
Relationship Between the Mean Total Sample Size Adjustment Factor Table 
Viewing Time and the Measured Knowledge Levels
Panel A: Mean (Median) Total Table Viewing Time by Knowledge Level
301.08
234.17
Mean 
Total 
Time In 
Seconds 2i2.9
226.93
MediumNo Low High
Level of Knowledge
Panel B: Comparative Statistics 
ANOVA
Knowledge Score 
Planned Comparisons
d f
3,52
No versus High Knowledge
Low versus Moderate Knowledge
Low and High versus Low and Moderate Knowledge
F Value 
.87
F Value 
.07 
.82 
1.08
p-value
.4620
p-value
.7976
.3691
.3031
Hvpothesis Three 
The third hypothesis examined the extent of an auditor’s 
knowledge of the firm decision aid by comparing the auditor’s selected sample 
size based on tolerable misstatement, the verbal descriptors of the client’s control
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risk, the degree of reliance on other substantive audit procedures, and the 
expected error rate, to the sample size implied by the familiar decision aid based 
on the same verbal descriptors. Therefore, Hypothesis Three tested the auditor’s 
knowledge of the complete decision aid. This is different from Hypothesis Two, 
which examined the effect of knowledge of one component of the familiar 
decision aid. In Hypothesis Two, the auditor was selecting the sample adjustment 
factor. On the other hand. Hypothesis Three had auditors select the decision aid 
sample size without actually using the decision aid. For example, the first 
question on Part II of the Post-Experimental Questionnaire was:
1. If the control risk is assessed at moderate and there is moderate
evidence provide by other substantive procedures, the sample size 
is
A. 10
B. 16
C. 22
D. 41
E. Other
It was expected that experience with the decision aid, either in manual or 
computerized form, would allow subjects to choose the same sample size as 
would be provided by the decision aid based on the same verbal descriptors of the 
control risk and reliance on other audit procediues. Therefore, participants with 
more decision aid experience should match the decision aid sample size more 
often than participants with less decision aid experience. It was not possible to 
use a Chi-Square because all cells had expected frequencies of less than 5. In 
addition, a Fisher’s Exact Test could not be run because of the size of the 
contingency table. Therefore, decision aid experience was regressed on the total
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number o f correct matches between the auditor’s sample size and the decision aid 
sample size. However, contrary to expectation, manual decision aid or computer 
decision aid experience were not significant in explaining the number of correct 
sample size matches (F=.68, p=.8751).
Although the post-experimental questions were designed to test for an 
exact match between the correct sample size and the auditor’s chosen sample size, 
it appears relevant to also test whether decision aid experience allows the auditor 
to closely approximate the decision aid sample size. Therefore, a difference score 
v. ss "dculated for the net difference between the decision aid sample size and the 
auditor’s sample size summed across the five multiple choice questions. The net 
difference was then correlated with manual decision aid experience. As would be 
expected more experience with the decision aid leads to a lower total difference 
(Pearson correlation coefficient, -.23, p=.03). In addition, manual decision aid 
experience was significant is explaining the total net difference between the 
decision aid sample size and the auditor’s sample size (F=l .85, p=.04).
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